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INTRODUCTION
The United States government has avoided tort liability for
exposing people to radiation, asbestos, Agent Orange, and blood
contaminated by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).' In
See, e.g., Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702-04 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
government bears burden of proving that claim by radiation victims under Federal Tort
Claims Act (FICA) was barred by discretionary function exception); In re Consolidated U.S.
Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 992-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that discretionary
function exception barred recovery under FrCA for victims of radiation from Hiroshima
bombing and atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons); Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d
1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that discretionary function exception precluded gov-
ernment liability for injuries resulting from radioactive fallout of atom bomb testing); see
also Robert F. Blomquist, Amercan Toxic Tort Law: An Historical Background, 1979-1987, 10
PACE ENVrL. L. REV. 85, 113-19 (1992) (discussing district court's holding in Allen); Grover
Glenn Hankins, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Smooth Stone for the Sling, 31 GONZ. L REV. 27,
41-53 (1995-96) (discussing application of FTCA's discretionary function exception to radia-
tion claims); Nestor M. Davidson, Note, Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the
Human Radiation Experiments, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1221-22 (1996) (same).
See, e.g., Lively v. United States, 870 F.2d 296, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
discretionary function exception barred recovery by longshoreman exposed to asbestos);
Gordon v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 835 F.2d 96, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
discretionary function exception barred claim by merchant seaman exposed to asbestos);
Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that General
Service Administration's decision to sell asbestos "as is" fell within discretionary function
exception and barred claims for injuries); Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283, 290 (lst
Cir. 1985) (holding that decisions by government concerning whether and when to warn of
hazards of working with asbestos constituted discretionary function); see also Gideon Mark,
Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 898 n.160 (1983) (noting that
claims against United States for asbestos injuries have been unsuccessful because of discre-
tionary function exception); cf Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 889 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that contribution claim by government contractor under Suits in Admi-
ralty Act for asbestos liability was barred by discretionary function exception); In reJoint E.
& S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 891 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that discretionary func-
tion exception limited claims under Suits in Admiralty Act for exposure to asbestos). But cf.
Dube v. Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 796-800 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that discretion-
ary function exception did not bar certain asbestos claims under FTCA).
See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Lab. Litig., 818 F.2d 194, 199-201 (2d Cir. 1987)
(stating that discretionary function exception and Feres doctrine precluded Agent Orange
claims); see also 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) (authorizing government disability payments for
some Agent Orange claims); William J. Blechman, Comment, Agent Orange and the Govern-
ment Contract Defense: Are Military Manufacturers Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 489, 494-526 (1982) (discussing government contractor defense to tort claims and
its relation to sovereign immunity and discretionary authority); Blomquist, supra, at 111-12
(discussing Feres doctrine and discretionary function exception as applied to Agent Orange
cases).
See C.R.S. by D.B.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 802 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
military's decisions regarding screening blood for HIV and notifying those at risk of infec-
tion were exercise of discretionary function); Linda M. Dorney, Comment, Culpable Conduct
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each of these settings, among others, the government has suc-
cessfully relied on the "discretionary function exception" to the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FICA).' This Article discusses causa-
tion, an issue that arises in many FTCA actions in which the
government invokes the exception. This issue, however, has
received almost no attention from the courts or commentators.
The causation issue may arise whenever an FTCA plaintiff's
injuries stem, not from the single act of a government employee,
but from a course of government conduct. In many such cases,
one cannot pinpoint a single cause of the injuries. In some of
these cases, the plaintiff can plausibly argue that the injuries
were caused by conduct that is not protected by the discretionary
function exception, while the government can just as plausibly
argue that the injuries were caused by conduct that is protected
by the exception. If the plaintiff's argument prevails, she may
recover by showing that the injurious governmental conduct was
tortious under the law of the state where the injuries occurred.
If the government's argument prevails, the plaintiffs claim is
barred by sovereign immunity. Thus,. the question of what "real-
ly" caused the plaintiffs injuries for purposes of applying the
with Impunity: The Blood Industry and the IDA's Responsibility for the Spread of AIDS Through
Blood Products, 3J. PHARMACY & L. 129, 162-63 (1994) (discussing government's arguments
and court decisions finding that failure to regulate blood is discretionary function).
For a general discussion of the role of the discretionary function exception in protect-
ing the government from tort liability for catastrophic accidents, see ALBERTJ. ROSENTHAL
ET AL., CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 39-41 (1963); HaroldJ. Krent,
Prserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38
UCLA L REV. 871, 871 (1991) (discretionary function exception "limit[s] the federal
government's exposure by perhaps billions of dollars a year").
The FTCA is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1994). The discretionary
function exception is codified at § 2680(a), in the italicized language below:
§ 2680. Exceptions
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to -
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretinary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (emphasis added).
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discretionary function exception is a potentially dispositive
threshold issue in many FTCA cases.
This Article finds the answer to the causation question in
statutory language that has been largely ignored. The discretion-
ary function exception preserves federal sovereign immunity
from tort claims that are "based upon" a government official's
exercise of, or failure to exercise, "a discretionary function. " '
To decide whether the exception preserves sovereign immunity
from a particular tort claim, a court must determine: (1) what
government conduct the claim is "based upon"; and (2) whether
that government conduct constitutes the exercise of a "discre-
tionary function." Many courts and commentators have ad-
dressed the second issue by exploring the meaning of the statu-
tory term "discretionary function."4 In contrast, no court until
Id. § 2680(a).
See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (indi-
cating that courts have struggled with meaning of term "discretionary function" since soon
after FTCA's enactment); Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act - A Statutory Interpre-
tation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1, 40-45 (1946) (discussing exceptions to FTCA and their scope); see
generally John W. Bagby & Gary 1- Gittings, The Eusive Discretionary Function Exception frm
Government Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of Federal Liability, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 223 (1992)
(devising and applying mode of analysis for determining when to use discretionary function
exception); Ronald A. Cass, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS
1503 (1987) [hereinafter ACUS REPORT] (discussing need to clarify discretionary function
exception, but noting such clarification is unlikely to occur); David S. Fishback & Gail
Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to
Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO 1- REV. 291, 294-303 (1988-89) (detailing application of discretionary
function exception in three leading cases); William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Courts Recent
Overhaul of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. LJ. AM.
U. 1 (1993) (summarizing objectives of tort law and examining how courts pursue those
objectives when deciding applicability of discretionary function exception); Krent, supra
note 1, at 875-84 (examining development of discretionary function); Daniel E. Matthews,
Federal Tort Claims Act - The Proper Scope of the Discretnary Function Exception, 6 AM. U. L
REV. 22 (1957) (discussing background and case law surrounding discretionary function
exception and concluding more precise definition of term is needed); Cornelius J. Peck,
The Federal Tort Claims Ac - A Proposed Constftion of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31
WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956) (discussing considerable amount of litigation and confusion
arising from discretionary function exception and suggesting proper construction);John M.
Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion, 57 TUL. L. REv. 776, 804-22 (1983) (discussing
meaning of "discretion" in discretionary function exception); Donald N. Zillman, Protecting
Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 47 MAINE L. REv. 365 (1995) (assessing discretionary function exception); Note, The
Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 488 (1953)
(discussing scope, meaning, and application of discretionary function exception).
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recently,5 and no recent commentator,' has examined the ante-
cedent question of how to identify what government conduct a
tort claim is "based upon" within the meaning of the statute.
Rather, courts have simply assumed that an FTCA plaintiffs
claim is based upon the government conduct that the plaintiff
alleges was wrongful and proximately caused the plaintiffs inju-
ries. This Article argues that such an assumption is not always
warranted.7
' See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(holding discretionary function exception precluded claims based on FDA policy decisions
by focusing on meaning of "based upon").
6 One scholar briefly addressed the statutory term "based upon" in a 1956 article
arguing for an interpretation of the exception, the thrust of which the Supreme Court
later rejected. See Peck, supra note 4, at 225-26, 228-29 (discussing meaning of "based upon"
language); Rogers, supra note 4, at 821-22 (discussing Professor Peck's article); infra notes
100, 112 (analyzing Professor Peck's approach to proximate causation).
' In general, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort only if she shows that the
defendant's wrongful conduct "proximately caused" the injuries for which damages are
sought. As Justice O'Connor recently explained the concept in relation to the Endangered
Species Act:
Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise definition. It is
easy enough, of course, to identify the extremes. The farmer whose fertilizer is
lifted by tornado from tilled fields and deposited miles away in a wildlife refuge
cannot, by any stretch of the term, be considered the proximate cause of death
or injury to protected species occasioned thereby. At the same time, the land-
owner who drains a pond on his property, killing endangered fish in the pro-
cess, would likely satisfy any formulation of the principle. We have.., said that
proximate causation normally eliminates the bizarre, and have noted its func-
tionally equivalent alternative characterizations in terms of foreseeability and
duty. Proximate causation depends to a great extent on considerations of the
fairness of imposing liability for remote consequences.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2420
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See
generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 42, at 272-80 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing proximate cause and various proposed standards of causation); Glen 0.
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713,
713-14 (1982) (discussing concept of causation in tort law). Several scholars of law and
economics have developed a "probabilistic" conception of causation. See, e.g., Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 71-72 (1975) (distin-
guishing concepts of cause, causal link, "but for" cause, and proximate cause); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 109, 111-15 (1983); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in
the Law of Torts, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 466-70 (1980); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicari-
ous Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines,
101 HAtv. L. REV. 563, 564-66 (1988). Under that conception, Event 1 "causes" Event 2 if
Event I increases the probability that Event 2 will occur, compared to the probability that
University of California, Davis
The first and only decision to address the statutory phrase
"based upon" is the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Fisher
Brothers Sales, Inc. v. United States.' Fisher Brothers held that tort
claims concerning a governmental ban on Chilean grapes were
"based upon" a discretionary decision by the Commissioner of
the Food and Drug Administration, and were not "based upon"
the allegedly negligent laboratory testing of grapes that preceded
the Commissioner's decision. This Article explains that the hold-
ing in Fisher Brothers was correct, but that the court's analysis was
not.' The court correctly held that the plaintiffs' claims were
barred because their resolution would have required the kind of
judicial scrutiny of executive-branch decisionmaking that the
discretionary function exception was intended to prevent. The
Fisher Brothers court used the wrong standard, however, for iden-
tifying claims that require such scrutiny. This Article's proposed
approach would treat an FTCA claim as based upon conduct
that is protected by the exception - even if the plaintiff alleges
that his injuries were proximately caused by wrongful, unprotect-
ed conduct - if the plaintiff must prove that the allegedly
wrongful, unprotected conduct influenced the manner in which a
discretionary function was exercised.' This "influence" test ap-
plies in all of the factual settings in which the "based upon"
issue arises." It prevents FTCA plaintiffs from avoiding the
Event 2 would have occurred in the absence of Event 1. See, e.g., Shavell, supra, at 468.
Thus, a departure from the required standard of care "causes" an injury when the depar-
ture increases the probability that the injury will occur beyond the probability that it would
have occurred in the absence of the departure. The departure "proximately" causes the
injury when the increase in probability is large enough to offset administrative costs of
determining whether a departure has occurred. See, e.g., iU at 502-03 (explaining instru-
mentalist approach to causation); Sykes, supra, at 572 (analyzing application of probabilistic
view of causation to enterprise liability example).
8 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff's claim was not based
upon defendant's conduct), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995). See aLso Payton, 679 F.2d at 486
(Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that there is no known case
which addresses whether Congress intended discretionary function exception to permit
plaintiffs to route FrCA claims through palpably discretionary act to antecedent act, in order
to maintain action otherwise barred by exception). The facts and procedural history of
Fisher Brothers are described in detail below. See infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 176-221 and accompanying text (arguing that Fisher Brothers majority
reached correct result through improper approach).
"0 See infra notes 222-44 and accompanying text (discussing application of "influence"
standard to "based upon" issue).
" See infra notes 244-393 and accompanying text (explaining broad applicability of
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discretionary function exception by mere artful pleading and
thereby protects executive-branch discretionary decisionmaking
from the skewing effects of tort litigation.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the statuto-
ry background of the discretionary function exception."2 Part II
analyzes the Supreme Court's interpretation of the exception."
Part III evaluates the approaches to resolving the "based upon"
issue taken by the en banc majority and by the en banc dissent
in Fisher Brothers.'" Part IV proposes a new approach - the ap-
plication of an "influence" standard - which is derived from
the reasoning of, but distinct from the approach taken by, the
Fisher Brothers majority. 5 Part IV then explains how the influ-
ence standard would apply to cases decided by federal courts of
appeals in which the "based upon" issue has arisen but has not
been addressed. 6
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Despite criticism, it still is the law that the federal government
enjoys sovereign immunity from lawsuits unless Congress has
waived that immunity by statute." One of the major statutes in
influence standard).
" See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (discussing how "based upon" issue
relates to FrCA's waiver of sovereign immunity).
" See infra notes 27-112 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases con-
struing discretionary function exception).
" See infra notes 113-221 and accompanying text (comparing majority and dissent ap-
proaches in Fisher Brothers).
" See infra notes 222-43 and accompanying text (proposing influence standard for
resolving "based upon" issue).
6 See infra notes 244-395 and accompanying text (explaining how influence standard
would apply to cases decided by federal courts of appeals).
" See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (stating that
Congress must unequivocally express intent to waive sovereign immunity for such waiver to
be effective). For criticism of sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immu-
nity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions From the Public-
Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L REv. 867, 867 n.1 (1970) (noting prevalent criticism of sovereign
immunity doctrine); John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121, 1126
(1993) (same); see also Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 343-46, 350 (1995) (arguing that Supreme Court has authority to abro-
gate federal sovereign immunity from private actions for constitutional violations). For an
encyclopedic review and criticism of the history of governmental immunity from tort claims
in the United States and Great Britain, see Professor Edwin Borchard's eight-part series:
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which Congress has done so - and the subject of this Article -
is the Federal Tort Claims Act. 8 The FTCA waives federal sov-
ereign immunity from liability in money damages for certain
torts of federal employees. 9
The FTCA promises much but delivers little in the way of
relief from sovereign immunity. The promise is set forth in the
FTCA's general waiver provision. It exposes the government to
liability
for money damages . .. for injury or loss of property, or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred?
That apparently broad exposure to tort liability is limited consid-
erably by a list of FTCA exceptions that preserve sovereign im-
munity from certain types of tort claims." Most of the excep-
tions are fairly clear and narrow.' The most important excep-
Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE LJ. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925); Governmental
Responsibility in Tort (pts. 4-6), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927); Theories of Governmental
Responsibilit in Tort (pts. 7-8), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577, 734 (1928).
18 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1994). See generally United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S.
217, 219-21 & nn.6-9 (1949) (tracing history of FTCA).
,9 See §§ 1346(b), 2674. There are other federal statutes, in addition to the FTCA, that
waive federal sovereign immunity from certain tort claims. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52
(1994) (waiving immunity under Suits in Admiralty Act); i& §§ 781-90 (waiving immunity
under Public Vessels Act); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483 (1994) (finding that
agency's "sue-and-be-sued" clause waived sovereign immunity from constitutional-tort
claim). However, the FTCA is the major such statute. Still other federal statutes waive fed-
eral sovereign immunity from types of claims other than tort claims. The major examples
of the latter are the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), which waives sovereign immunity
from claims for money damages based on a government contract, a statute, or the Consti-
tution; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1994), which waives
sovereign immunity from claims for declaratory or injunctive relief related to certain agen-
cy actions. See also Borchard (pt. 1), supra note 17, at 32-34 (describing earlier statutory
waivers of federal sovereign immunity).
20 § 1346(b); see also § 2674.
, See § 2680(a)-(n). A tort claim against the government may be barred by sovereign
immunity even if it does not fall within one of the express exceptions to the FTCA. See
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). For example, the Supreme Court has held
that the FTCA implicitly preserves sovereign immunity from tort claims by members of the
military for injuries "incident to" military service. See id. The Court has also held that a tort
claim may be barred by the Flood Control Act, which predated the FICA. See United States
v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604-12 (1986).
One exception, for example, preserves immunity from claims "arising out of the loss,
700 [Vol. 30:691
1997] Causation and the Discretionary Function Exception 701
tion, though, is unclear and broad." Known as the
"discretionary function exception," it preserves immunity from
"[a]ny claim based upon . . the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused."24
The text of the discretionary function exception requires a
court to ask at least two distinct questions. 5 First, a court must
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." See § 2680(b). The other
exceptions preserve sovereign immunity from such claims as those arising out of the collec-
tion or assessment of taxes or customs duties, see § 2680(c), activities related to national
defense, see § 2680(e), the imposition of quarantines, see § 2680(0, and most intentional
torts, such as assault and battery, see § 2680(h).
' See H.R. REP. No. 79-1287 at 5-6 (1945) (referring to discretionary function excep-
tion as "highly important"); S. REP. No. 77-1196 at 7 (1942) (same); H.R. REP. No. 77-2245
at 10 (1942) (same); ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1504 (1987) (stating that discretionary
function exception "has critical importance for the scope of government exposure to liabil-
ity"); RICHARD H. FALLON JR. Er AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsEM 1031 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (stating that discre-
tionary function exception is "most important" exception and "has caused difficulty from
the outset"); Peck, supra note 4, at 208 (noting that, a decade after enactment, discretion-
ary function exception "appears to have given rise to considerable confusion and litiga-
tion").
"' 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The discretionary function exception has remained unchanged
since it was enacted as part of the FTCA in 1946. An identical provision was included in
earlier, unenacted bills that would have waived federal sovereign immunity from tort
claims. See United States v. S.A Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airines),
467 U.S. 797, 809 (1984) (tracing language of discretionary function exception to bills
introduced in 1942).
" Because both questions required by the text of the discretionary function exception
relate to the scope of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, they are questions of fed-
eral, not state, law. Cf. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 851-52 (1984) (holding that
federal law governs question of whether plaintiff's claim "ar[ose] in respect of... the de-
tention of any goods or merchandize by an officer of customs" for purposes of § 2680(c)).
The applicability of the discretionary function exception is a jurisdictional issue; if the
exception applies to a tort claim, the claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as a result of
which a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. See, e.g., In re Glacier Bay, 71
F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995). The exception also partakes, however, of an affirmative
defense, and accordingly, the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have held that
the government bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exception. See Sabow v.
United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996); Carlyle v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982); Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517, 520 (7th
Cir. 1952); see also Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(discussing dispute among courts over burden of proof); Peck, supra note 4, at 225 & n.66
(stating that burden of proof is properly on government). But cf. Rothrock v. United States,
62 F.3d 196, 198 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that issue is open in Seventh Circuit);
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ask upon what government conduct the claim is based. Second,
the court must ask whether that conduct constitutes the exercise
of a "discretionary function."'
II. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has addressed the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA many times since the FITCA's enactment
in 1946Y None of the Court's decisions, however, have dis-
cussed how to determine what government conduct a tort claim
is based upon for purposes of the exception." Instead, the par-
ties and the Court have simply assumed that the claim was based
upon the government conduct that the plaintiff alleged was
wrongful and proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.' Pro-
Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1526 n.6 (llth Cir. 1993) (stating that issue is open
in Eleventh Circuit); Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1105 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993) (sug-
gesting that issue is open in Tenth Circuit). Regardless of this hybrid nature, the applicabil-
ity of the exception is always decided by the court, even to the extent its applicability de-
pends on resolution of disputed facts, because FTCA actions are tried exclusively by federal
courts sitting without juries. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
For brevity, this Article generally will use "exercise" to encompass the exercise or
performance of, as well as the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function.
" See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-26 (1991) (discussing discretionary
function exception to F]TCA); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 535-39 (1988)
(same); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 807-20 (same); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
315, 315-21 (1957) (same); Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956) (same);
United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (per curiam) (same); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17-45 (1953) (same); see also Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 61-76 (1955) (described in Berovi&z, 486 U.S. at 538 n.3, as a decision
'illuminat[ing] the appropriate scope" of exception); cf. Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-13 (1988) (discussing discretionary function exception in govern-
ment-contractor tort defense case).
The Court has, however, addressed the meaning of the term "based upon" as it is
used in a different statute: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. See Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1993). The implications of Nelson for the "based upon"
issue that arises under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA are discussed infra
at note 112.
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-25 (determining whether "challenged conduct" constitut-
ed exercise of discretionary function); id at 327-28, 332 (describing seven instances of
negligent government conduct by bank regulators alleged in complaint and determining
that "each of the regulatory actions in question involved the kind of policy judgment that
the discretionary function exception was designed to shield"); Bernovitz, 486 U.S. at 540,
542-48 (determining whether each of plaintiffs' "specific allegations of agency wrongdoing"
constituted exercise of discretionary function); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 819-20 (deter-
mining whether each allegedly negligent action constituted exercise of discretionary func-
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ceeding on that assumption, the Court has focused exclusively
on whether the allegedly wrongful and injurious conduct consti-
tuted the exercise of a "discretionary function."
Although the Court has not directly addressed the "based
upon" issue, its precedent illuminates the issue in two ways.
First, in developing a test for identifying a "discretionary func-
tion," the Court has relied on the purpose and history of the
exception." The Court's understanding of that purpose and
history should also inform the resolution of the "based upon"
issue. Second, several of the Court's decisions addressing the
exception involved injuries arising from a course of government
conduct." Any proposed resolution of the "based upon" issue
must be consistent with those decisions if the lower federal
courts are to apply it.
A. The Supreme Court's Two-Step Test for Determining
Whether Government Conduct Constitutes the
Exercise of a Discretionary Function
The Court has often stated that the purpose of the discretion-
ary function exception is to prevent the courts in FTCA actions
from "second guessing" public policy decisions by executive-
branch officials.3" That purpose is said primarily to reflect: (1)
separation-of-powers concerns and, relatedly, (2) the incompe-
tence of courts, compared to executive-branch officials, to de-
cide matters of public policy." In keeping with this purpose,
tion).
' See Ber*ovitr, 486 U.S. at 537; Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808; Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 32-
34; see also Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that "reservation of
governmental immunity embodied in the [discretionary function] exemption should be
bounded by its justifying purpose").
" See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text (discussing Berkovntz, Varig Airline,
Dalehite, and Gaubert).
" See, e.g., Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323; Bessitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37; Vaig Airlines, 467 U.S.
at 814; see also H.R. REP. No. 77-2245 at 10 (1942) (discussing discretionary function
exception).
' See e.g., Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170-71 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(discussing separation of powers and judicial restraint in tort actions against government);
Osborne Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Ton Claims Ac4 57 GEO.
L.J. 81, 121-23 (1968) (giving three predominant reasons for continuing to recognize
discretionary immunity); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968) (justiciability doctrine
reflects "dual limitations" based on separation of powers and traditional understanding of
what matters are "thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process"); Gray,
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the Court has adopted a test for identifying a "discretionary
function" that protects policy-based decisions from tort liability
and leaves non-policy-based decisions unprotected.'s
The Court applies a two-step test to determine whether the
challenged governmental action in a particular case constitutes
the exercise of a discretionary function. The first step asks
whether the conduct is "discretionary."s' An action is "discre-
tionary," the Court has said, if it involves "choice." 'T According-
ly, the Court has said that an action is not discretionary if tak-
ing or not taking the action violates a mandatory statute, regula-
tion, or other agency prescription. The Court has explained that
a government official has no "choice" but to follow such pre-
scriptions.3 7 Thus, in Hatahley v. United States,'M for example,
the Court held that the exception did not protect the govern-
ment from liability for impounding horses owned by Native
Americans, because the federal range agents violated regulations
requiring them to give notice to the owners before impounding
the horses. 9
Government conduct that satisfies the first step must still
satisfy the second step to be protected by the discretionary func-
tion exception.' The second step asks whether the government
712 F.2d at 511 (general rationale of sovereign immunity is that "courts should not
interfere with government operations and policymaking").
, See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text (explaining two-part test).
35 See Ber*ovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
a See id.
See id. (stating that "discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.");
see generally D. Scott Barash, Comment, The Discretionay Function Exception and Mandatory
Regulations, 54 U. Cni. L. REv. 1300, 1300-34 (1987) (discussing relevance to exception of
statutory and regulatory violations).
351 U.S. 173 (1956).
See id. at 177-78, 181.
4 The fact that an official's conduct does not satisfy the Court's two-step test means
that government liability for that conduct is not barred by the discretionary function
exception. See id. Once the plaintiff overcomes the sovereign immunity bar posed by the
exception, he still can recover only by proving that the conduct was "wrongful" under the
law of the state in which the conduct occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994) (allocating
jurisdiction for claims against United States employee based on wrongful or negligent act
or omission). The Court has held that, in making that proof, the plaintiff cannot rely on
state law imposing strict liability. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17-45 (1953). In so holding, the Court relied on the fact that
the FTCA waives sovereign immunity from tort liability only for the "wrongful" conduct of
(Vol. 30:691
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conduct involves the "kind" of discretion that Congress intended
the discretionary function exception to protect."' Thus, not all
discretionary conduct is protected by the exception. This second
step is grounded in part upon the statutory text. On its face, the
term "discretionary function" does not appear designed to protect
all discretionary acts. "Discretionary function" is a term of art
that has been traced to doctrines predating the FrCA, such as
those for awarding judicial relief against government officers and
municipalities." Under those doctrines, courts could direct offi-
cers to carry out "ministerial" but not "discretionary" acts, and
could hold municipalities liable when they carried out "propri-
etary," but not "discretionary," functions."
The difficulty, and the subject of the Court's decisions to
date, has concerned precisely what kind of discretion the excep-
tion protects. The Court has addressed the matter in a general
way by holding that the exception protects only discretionary
decisions "based on considerations of public policy."" The
Court has also explained that public policy considerations
government agents. See Laird 406 U.S. at 801; Dakhit4 346 U.S. at 44-45.
", See Be,*ovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (stating that second step focuses on kind of discretion
exercised by government official); United States v. SA Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (holding that "basic inquiry concern-
ing the application of the discretionary function exception is whether the challenged acts
of a Government employee - whatever her rank - are of the nature and quality that
Congress intended to shield from tort liability").
' See Daehite 346 U.S. at 27 & n.16 (quoting statement by Justice Department official
during congressional committee hearing that discretionary function exception expressed
common law limit on judicial review that courts probably would have inferred even in
absence of express provision); i& at 34 & n.30 (referring to "substantial historical ancestry"
of distinction between executive officials' discretionary acts and those compelled by
"positive rules of law"); see also Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 44 (delineating difference between
clerical or ministerial functions and discretionary functions in determining whether
mandamus will lie against government official); Krent, supra note 1, at 876 & n.22
(discussing historical antecedents of discretionary function exception). But cf. Rogers, supra
note 4, at 805-06 (arguing that exception should not be interpreted strictly in accordance
with mandamus principles).
'" See CHEsTER JAMES ANTIEAU & MILO MECHAM, TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT
OFFIcERs AND EMPLOES §§ 2.4-2.9, at 24-32 (1990) (discussing distinction between
"discretionary" and "ministerial" functions for purposes of official immunity); WILLIAM B.
WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 11 & n.1 (1957) (claiming that governmental
immunity for proprietary functions is defense native to municipal law); Krent, supra note 1,
at 876 n.22 (providing examples of ministerial, discretionary, and proprietary functions);
Rogers, supra note 4, at 780-87 (discussing mandamus).
44 See Berovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
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include social, economic, and political considerations.45 Further-
more, the Court has distinguished public policy considerations
from scientific, mathematical, and other "objective" criteria.'
Despite this guidance, the second step of the Court's two-step
test continues to generate confusion. 7
The distinction between the kind of discretionary conduct
that the exception protects and the kind that it does not is
illustrated by Indian Towing Co. v. United States.' In Indian Tow-
ing, a tugboat owner whose boat ran aground sued the United
States under the FTCA. The owner claimed that the grounding
occurred because the government had failed to keep a nearby
lighthouse in working order.' The Court found that the
government's decision to erect the lighthouse in the first place
involved protected discretion, but its maintenance of the light-
house did not.' As Justice Scalia explained in a later case, it is
doubtful that the decision to keep the lighthouse working was
susceptible to public policy considerations or, for that matter,
that the officials responsible for its maintenance even had au-
thority to consider public policy.5
For convenience, the phrase "protected conduct" will be used
to refer to conduct that constitutes the exercise of a discretion-
ary function under the Court's two-step test; the phrase "unpro-
tected conduct" will be used to refer to conduct that does not
satisfy the Court's two-step test. It is important to keep in mind
that conduct may be unprotected either because it does not in-
volve any discretion - an official's actions are dictated by stat-
ute, regulation, or other prescription - or because, although
45 See id.; VarigAirines, 467 U.S. at 820.
4' See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 331; Bedlovitz, 486 U.S. at 545; see also, e.g., In re Glacier Bay,
71 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that certain activities connected to
conducting hydrographic surveys were not protected by exception because they involved
discretion of a purely scientific nature). But cf. Fishback & Killefer, supra note 4, at 325-26
(arguing that scientific and technical decisions implicate protected discretion).
47 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1005
(2d ed. 1994) (noting that "[a]ll of the tests for discretionary functions ... present difficult
line-drawing problems. Inconsistent decisions, thus, are common.").
48 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
o See id. at 62.
0 See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538 n.3 (discussing Indian Towing); Indian Towing, 350 U.S.
at 69.
51 See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the action involves discretion, it does not involve the kind of
discretion - consideration of public policy - that the excep-
tion was designed to protect.
1. Breadth of the Two-Step Test
Given the manner in which the Court has applied the two-
step test for identifying a discretionary function, the exception
cloaks the government with much of the sovereign immunity
protection that the FICA's general waiver provision purports to
strip away. It is usually easy for government conduct to satisfy
the first step of the Court's two-part test, which asks whether the
challenged conduct involved "choice." Few actions by govern-
ment employees are specifically mandated by a statute, regula-
tion, or agency policy.' Instead, most government employees
have discretion in most matters, either because their actions
simply are not covered by any statute or agency directive, or
because the pertinent statutes and directives confer discretion
on them. Indeed, assume that no statute covers the conduct of a
particular agency's official. The agency then has an incentive,
when drafting regulations, to be liberal in granting discretion to
that official if it wishes to take advantage of the discretionary
function exception.ss
Likewise, it is often easy for government conduct to satisfy the
second step of the Court's two-part test, which asks whether the
challenged conduct was susceptible to public policy consider-
ations. The Court has made clear that protected policymaking
includes the balancing of safety concerns against budgetary or
5 See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 & n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that virtually all
administration decisions involve discretion); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160,
1174 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (same); Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 P. 462, 468 (Cal. 1920)
(quoted in ANT'EAU & MECHAM, supra note 43, at 27); see also PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOV-
ERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 66 (1983) (arguing that "[s]treet-level
officials... are actually awash in discretion").
" See Bagby & Gittings, supra note 4, at 238 (describing incentive created by discretion-
ary function exception for upper-level regulators to delegate minor policy making authori-
ty); Krent, supra note 1, at 892 (arguing that Berkovitz Court's interpretation of exception
creates perverse incentive for agencies to allow government officials to exercise unguided
discretion); Donald Zillman, Congress, Courts, and Government Tort Liability: Reflections on the
Discretionay Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Ac 1989 UTAH L. REV. 687, 738
(noting that exception encourages government agencies to include public policy discussion
in all memoranda to avoid litigation).
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other feasibility concerns.' Such balancing underlies many gov-
ernment decisions - just as it does many private decisions -
that become the subject of tort suits." In the typical tort case,
the plaintiff argues that the defendant took inadequate precau-
tions against the alleged injuries; the defendant responds that it
took all cost-justified precautions.56 The parties to FTCA actions
often make similar arguments, thus framing the issue in a way
that supports the conclusion that the challenged government
conduct involved protected discretion."
In its most recent decision construing the discretionary func-
tion exception, United States v. Gaubert,sa the Court made it
even easier for the government to satisfy the second part of the
two-part test.59 In Gaubert, the Court held that the exception
barred FTCA claims related to government oversight of a savings
and loan association.' In so holding, the Court stated that
there is a "strong presumption" that a government employee
- See United States v. SA Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 819-20 (1984) (noting that government decisions regarding extent of safety
regulation entail balancing safety objectives "against such practical considerations as staffing
and funding"); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 40-41 (1953) (finding that exception
protected government decisions that involved balancing considerations related to program
feasibility, such as production costs); Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1111-12
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding that exception barred claim challenging government conduct
based on balancing safety and cost concerns). But see Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 58 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that not all decisions that balance care and cost deserve immunity).
' But see ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that exception did not protect government's failure to maintain road in national park
merely because that failure reflected budget constraints: "[bludgetary constraints underlie
virtually all governmental activity").
' This line of argument about relative "fault" reflects Judge Learned Hand's formula
for determining negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (outlining three components to determine negligence); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF LAW 164-67 (4th ed. 1992) (describing economics
behind Judge Hand's formula).
" See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1517 (claiming that "resource allocation issues
inevitably are drawn into issue in tort litigation"). The Court has been criticized for indicat-
ing that the discretionary function exception protects any decision in which budgetary con-
straints could be considered. See, e.g., Domme v. United States, 61 F.3d 787, 793-96 (10th
Cir. 1995) (Henry, J., concurring) (arguing that insufficient government resources, without
more, does not always implicate discretionary function exception); Bagby & Gittings, supra
note 4, at 252 (same).
s' 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
See id. at 324-25; see also Zillman, supra note 4, at 384 (stating that Gaubert makes it
easier for government to use discretionary function exception).
60 See Gauber, 499 U.S. at 319-20, 327-34.
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exercises protected discretion when she acts under a regulation or
other agency guideline that expressly or by implication affords
the employee any kind of discretion.6 The Court appeared to
reason that the regulatory decision to grant discretion to an
official inherently involves public policy considerations. There-
fore, the Court determined, courts should presume that the
official's exercise of that discretion partakes of the same public
policy considerations." In addition, the Court in Gaubert em-
phasized that the relevant question is not the subjective one of
whether the government actor actually considered matters of
public policy when she made the challenged decision; rather,
the question is the objective one of whether the decision was
"susceptible to" public policy analysis.6" Thus, under Gaubert, a
decision is susceptible to public policy analysis if the
61 See i& at 324.
62 See id.
' See i4L at 325. Commentators both before and after Gaubert have argued that the
exception should apply only if the government proves that public policy was actually con-
sidered. See Bagby & Gittings, supra note 4, at 254-55 (arguing that government must prove
policy consideration took place); Krent, supra note 1, at 884-907 (arguing that exception
should apply only when challenged official action is result of deliberative process that in-
cludes policy considerations); HaroldJ. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND.
L REv. 1529, 1550 (1992) (same); Peck, supra note 4, at 222, 225-26 (same). Professors
Bagby and Gittings recognize, however, that such proof is "generally not a federal court
requiremenL" Bagby & Gittings, supra note 4, at 254. They.also appear to recognize that
such a requirement would, as a practical matter, impose significant procedural and docu-
mentation obligations on officials who exercise discretionary functions. See i&. at 261, 264-
65; see also Peck, supra note 4, at 226. It is doubtful, in light of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525-25 (1978), that federal
courts may put such procedural obligations on federal agencies.
Professor Peck cited the statutory term "based upon" to argue that the exception
protected not only (1) conduct that, the government proved, was actually grounded in
public policy considerations but also (2) conduct that, though not itself grounded in poli-
cy, was specifically directed or necessarily contemplated by an official who had exercised a
discretionary function. See Peck, supra note 4, at 228-29. Gaubert plainly rejects Professor
Peck's view that the government is required to prove that public policy was actually consid-
ered. See Gauber, 499 U.S. at 325. Gaubert does not, however, undermine Professor Peck's
contention that a claim is based upon the exercise of a discretionary function if the plain-
tiff challenges as wrongful an action that, though not itself discretionary, was specifically
directed by an official exercising a discretionary function. See id. at 324. That contention,
moreover, finds support in the language of the exception, discussed infra note 100, al-
though it is in some tension with Nelson, as discussed infra note 112. While this Article
focuses on a different situation from that upon which Professor Peck focused, I essentially
endorse his contention. See infra note 100 and text accompanying notes 237-38.
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decisionmaker has authority to, and reasonably could, consider
public policy when taking the action upon which the tort claim
is based.6'
2. Government Conduct Not Protected by the
Two-Step Test
While adopting a broad interpretation of the discretionary
function exception, the Court has made it clear that the excep-
tion does not immunize all government conduct from tort liabil-
ity.' The Supreme Court discussed what constitutes unprotect-
ed conduct at greatest length in Berkovitz v. United States.' In
that case, a child contracted polio from a polio vaccination. The
parents and the child sued the United States under the
FTCA.67 They contended that the government: (1) should not
have issued a license to the manufacturer of the vaccine that
caused the child's polio; and (2) should not have approved for
public release the particular lot of that manufacturer's vaccine
from which the child's vaccination had come.'s The govern-
ment contended that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
discretionary function exception.' The Court held that some of
the plaintiffs' theories of tort liability were barred by the excep-
tion, some were not, and some might or might not be.7"
The Berkovitz Court held that the exception would bar a chal-
lenge to the regulatory criteria for approving the lots of polio
vaccine for public release." To understand that holding, sup-
pose that one of the regulatory criteria called for a certain labo-
ratory test to be performed on only one out of every five lots,
64 See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 335-36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that decision can-
not be "susceptible" to policy analysis unless responsible decisionmaker has policymaking
authority).
6 As described above, the government's Achilles heel is the area in which government
officials violate statutory or regulatory prescriptions or exercise discretion based on techni-
cal, professional, or other "objective" criteria. See supra text accompanying notes 35-51.
486 U.S. 531, 535-39 (1986). See also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,
69 (1955) (illustrating the distinction between protected and unprotected discretion).
67 See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 533.
" See id. at 539-40.
6 See id. at 533.
7o See id. at 540-48.
See id. at 546 (holding that discretionary function exception bars claims challenging
government's policy in regulating release of vaccine lots).
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rather than every single lot. Suppose further that, because of
that criterion, the injurious lot was not tested; it did not happen
to be the fifth lot under the prescribed counting method. The
discretionary function exception would bar a claim that the
government was negligent in failing to test every single lot. Un-
derlying that result is the conclusion that the challenged criteri-
on was susceptible to policy analysis; for example, the govern-
ment could have devised it by balancing the benefits against the
costs of testing every lot.'
The Ber*ovitz Court further held, however, that the exception
would not bar a claim that the objective testing criteria had been
misapplied.73 To refer again to the hypothetical criterion de-
scribed above, suppose the injurious lot of vaccine should have
been subjected to a certain lab test - because it was the fifth
lot under the prescribed counting method - but that, by over-
sight, it was not tested. The exception would not bar a claim
based on that violation of the testing procedures. By entertain-
ing this type of claim, a court would not be second-guessing any
policy decision; on the contrary, it would be enforcing the ante-
cedent policy decision to test every fifth lot.74
The Berkovitz Court was unable to determine whether the
exception also barred a challenge to the manner in which the
government applied its criteria for licensing manufacturers to
produce polio vaccine.7' Whether that challenge was barred
depended on the nature of the licensing criteria, which was not
clear from the record. If applying the licensing criteria "in-
volve[d] the application of objective scientific standards," the
Court held, the decision to license the manufacturer would not
be protected by the discretionary function exception.7' On the
See id, (explaining that discretionary function exception protects independent policy
judgments of government officials).
' See id. at 546-47 (explaining that discretionary function exception does not bar claim
that government knowingly released lot of vaccine that did not comply with mandatory
safety standard).
' See Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that if exception were construed to insulate violations of mandatory stan-
dards that had been adopted in exercise of discretionary function, such construction would
undermine prior exercise of discretionary function).
1- See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544-45 (remanding to district court because parties inade-
quately addressed issue).
76 See id. at 545.
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other hand, that decision would be protected if applying the
criteria "incorporate[d] considerable 'policy judgment. '' 77 The
Court accordingly remanded the case for further proceedings on
the claim that the government was negligent in licensing the
manufacturer of the injurious vaccine.78
3. The Court's "Disaggregative" Approach to Applying
the Two-Step Test in Cases Involving a Course
of Government Conduct
In addition to illustrating the kind of conduct that is protect-
ed by the discretionary function exception, Berkovitz illustrates
how the Court applies the exception to claims arising from a
course of governmental conduct. Under that approach, the
Court applies its two-step test for identifying whether conduct is
protected, not to the course of conduct as a whole, but to the
specific components of the course of conduct that, the plaintiff
alleges, were wrongful and proximately caused the plaintiffs
injuries. The injurious government conduct in Berkovitz had at
least four components: (1) the development of criteria for li-
censing the manufacturers of polio vaccines; (2) the application
of those licensing criteria to individual manufacturers; (3) the
development of criteria for the public release of individual lots
of vaccine by a licensed manufacturer; and (4) the application
of those criteria to lots of vaccine. As described above, the
Court applied its two-part test to each allegedly negligent com-
ponent. 79  This approach may be described as
"disaggregative."o
The Court has not always so interpreted the discretionary
function exception. The disaggregative approach of the Berkovitz
n See id.
' See id. at 548.
See id. at 540, 542-48 (determining whether each of plaintiffs' specific allegations of
agency wrongdoing constituted exercise of discretionary function); see aLso supra notes 66-78
and accompanying text (explaining application of two-part test in Ber*ovitz).
80 See Krent, supra note 1, at 890 n.87 (stating that "[tihe difficulty of disaggregating
the officials' tasks for purposes of the Court's inquiry [in Berovtz] is troubling"); cf. ACUS
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1543 (finding that "[vlirtually any bureaucratic exercise of regula-
tory authority can be disaggregated into component parts such that one part arguably falls
outside the ambit of a narrow regulatory conduct exception, no matter how that more
limited exception is defined").
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Court differs from the approach used in Dalehite v. United
States, " the earliest Supreme Court decision construing the dis-
cretionary function exception. Dalehite involved the near-total
destruction of Texas City, Texas, by explosions of government-
produced, fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate.82 The government
was producing the fertilizer for shipment to European countries
ravaged by World War II. By a four-to-three vote, the Court
held that all of the tort claims arising from the explosions were
barred." In so holding, the Court focused on the discretionary
nature of the course of government conduct as a whole, rather
than on specific components of that course of conduct.' In
explaining the exception, the Court stated:
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there
is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in
carrying out the operations of government in accordance with
official directions cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the
protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be
needed, that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to per-
form a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed
by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.'
This passage suggests that the exception protects a subordinate
who carries out a government operation that was developed on
the basis of public policy, even if the subordinate's actions are
negligent and are not, themselves, susceptible to public-policy
considerations.87 That suggestion is confirmed by the Court's
conclusion that all of the claims were barred, even though the
plaintiff "claimed negligence, substantially on the part of the
81 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
8 See id. at 22-23.
1 See i& at 19-20.
8' See id. at 32-45.
" See id. at 30-36 (discussing rationale for Court's holding); see also Bagby & Gittings,
supra note 4, at 228 (discussing Dalehite as protecting negligent implementation of policy-
based decisions); Peck, supra note 4, at 215-16 (discussing how Court's analysis focused on
whole, rather than specific components).
86 See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36.
"7 See Bagby & Gittings, supra note 4, at 228 (construing Dakehite to protect negligent
implementation of policy-based decisions and criticizing that approach); Fishback &
Killefer, supra note 4, at 325 (reading Da/ehite to protect negligent implementation of poli-
cy-based decisions and endorsing that approach); Matthews, supra note 4, at 28-30, 34 (stat-.
ing that some lower courts construe Dakthite to protect negligent implementation of policy-
based decisions).
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entire body of federal officials and employees involved" in the
course of conduct." That conclusion appears to reflect a judg-
ment that the government's actions were discretionary, when
viewed in the aggregate, rather than a judgment that each in-
stance of negligent conduct was discretionary.'
The Court has never expressly foresworn the "aggregative"
approach suggested in Dalehite in favor of the disaggregative
approach used in Berkovitz. Indeed, there is language in a post-
Dalehite, pre-Berkovitz case - namely, United States v. Vaig Airlines
- suggesting that the exception protects the negligent imple-
mentation of programs based on protected discretion, even if
the negligent conduct itself did not involve protected discre-
tion.' Furthermore, the Court in Gaubert, a post-Berkovitz case,
held that the exception protected some components of a course
of government conduct that, as Justice Scalia observed in his
concurrence, did not seem to satisfy the two-part test if viewed
in isolation from the course of conduct of which they were a
part.91 Nonetheless, the majority in Gaubert purported to apply
See Da/khite, 346 U.S. at 18. The Dalehite dissent argued that
The common sense of this matter is that a policy adopted in the exercise of an
immune discretion was carried out carelessly by those in charge of detail. We
cannot agree that all the way down the line there is immunity for every balanc-
ing of care against cost, of safety against production, of warning against silence.
Id. at 58 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
'" The Court in Daehite, however, neither expressly embraced an aggregative approach
nor expressly rejected a disaggregative approach. Despite the language quoted in the text
supra accompanying note 86, and other indications that the Court took an aggregative ap-
proach, the Court purported to examine the discretionary nature of each allegedly negli-
gent government act, an examination that would be consistent with a disaggregative ap-
proach. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23-24 (describing instances of conduct found negligent by
district court); id. at 38-44 (discussing discretionary nature of each instance of allegedly
negligent conduct). Even so, the Daehite Court's conclusion that each allegedly negligent
act involved protected discretion was unconvincing; that, coupled with other indicia of an
aggregative approach, renders Dalehite ultimately ambiguous. It is perhaps that ambiguity
that caused the Court's later decisions construing the exception "not [to] follow[] a
straight line," United States v. S.A Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 811 (1984).
90 See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820 (concluding that because Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) exercised protected discretion in developing "spot-check" program of in-
specting airplanes, acts of FAA employees in executing spot-check program in accordance
with agency directives were protected).
"' See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 334 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (ex-
pressing doubt that individualized analysis necessarily leads to conclusion that discretionary
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its two-part test to each "challenged action[]" - each act that
was alleged to have been wrongful and to have proximately
caused the plaintiffs' injuries - and expressly held that each
such action satisfied that test.' The lower federal courts have
accordingly understood the Court's precedent to require this
disaggregative approach."
B. Implications of the Supreme Court's Decisions
for the "Based Upon" Issue
The Supreme Court's decisions have practical and doctrinal
implications for the "based upon" issue. As a practical matter,
the "based upon" issue has become important because of the
Court's disaggregative approach to applying its two-step test. As
a doctrinal matter, the Court's decisions indicate that courts
need not invariably assume that an FrCA action is exclusively
based upon the conduct that the plaintiff alleges was wrongful
and proximately caused the injuries.
1. Practical Implications
When a government official triggers the FTCA's broad waiver
provision by wrongfully causing injury "while acting within the
scope of his office or employment,"" the official seldom acts
function exception bars claims before Court); infra notes 106-11, 239-43 and accompanying
text (describing Justice Scalia's concurrence and its relation to approach proposed here).
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 327, 332-33 (describing seven alleged instances of negligent
government conduct by bank regulators and determining that each regulatory action in-
volved policy judgment that discretionary function exception was designed to shield); see
also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540, 542-48 (1986) (determining whether each
of plaintiffs' specific allegations of agency wrongdoing constituted exercise of discretionary
function); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20 (describing instances of negligent conduct al-
leged in complaint and determining that each instance satisfied two-part test).
" See, e.g., In re Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Ben*ovitz
requires courts to "examine separately" each claimed negligent act); Johnson v. United
States Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1991) (analyzing each challenged
action to determine whether claims were barred by exception); Kennewick Irrigation Dist.
v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Pooler v. United States, 787
F.2d 868, 870-71 (3d Cir. 1986) (same). But cf. Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1527-
28 (1lth Cir. 1993) (considering nature of government conduct as a whole rather than
each decision made by government); infra notes 328-41 and accompanying text (discussing
Autr").
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
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alone. Instead, the official is almost always acting within the
broad confines of some policy or program conceived and imple-
mented by other, higher-level officials.95 Moreover, especially
when the official is not a "street-level"' official, her wrongful
conduct may lead to injury only because it sets in motion con-
duct by other officials. It is therefore often possible for the
injured party to allege in good faith that any one of many ac-
tors and actions caused the injuries.
For example, suppose a poorly trained government lab techni-
cian provides defective data on the basis of which another offi-
cial, who arguably should have noticed the defect, licenses a
nuclear reactor in an earthquake-prone area. Fault for any re-
sulting injury might properly be laid at the door of the official
who designed or administered the training program for the
technician, the technician herself, or the licensing official. The
multiplicity of potentially culpable actors explains why, after a
government disaster, one often hears that there is "plenty of
blame to go around."
The Court's disaggregative approach to applying the two-step
test encourages FTCA plaintiffs to slice the injurious course of
government conduct into as many pieces as possible and to
spread the blame over as many of them as possible. At the start
of a lawsuit, the plaintiff cannot know the identity and role of
all of the potentially culpable officials. Nor can the plaintiff
identify with certainty all statutory and regulatory material that
might trigger, or defeat, a government defense under the discre-
tionary function exception. To defeat the defense, the plaintiff
usually should aim to fix ultimate blame as low in the bureau-
cracy as possible, where most officials apply objective criteria and
lack policymaking authority.' By virtue of that position, howev-
er, the targeted official will work under multiple layers of super-
vision, consisting of officials who may have had some role in
affirmatively causing or failing to prevent the injury. The govern-
ment should aim to kick the blame as far upstairs as possible,
' But see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (noting that applicable policy or
program often does not specifically either mandate or prohibit the wrongful conduct).
See SCHUCK, supra note 52, at 66 (discussing discretion of street-level officials).
See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 4, at 778 (noting that low-level officials' duties often
involve following detailed regulations and thus do not involve policymaking discretion).
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where the policymakers dwell. If the plaintiff and the
government each finds, respectively, an official whose conduct is
not protected and an official whose conduct is protected, the
court must decide which conduct the claim is based upon.
2. Doctrinal Implications
Berkovitz strongly suggests that an FTCA claim is not necessari-
ly based upon protected conduct merely because such conduct
lay at the beginning of the causal chain leading to injury. The
Berkovitz Court recognized that the government's decision con-
cerning which tests to perform on polio vaccines was a discre-
tionary function. But the Court ultimately held that the plain-
tiffs could recover if an FDA scientist failed to perform a re-
quired test on the injurious lot of polio vaccine." Thus, pro-
tected conduct (the establishment of testing protocols) preceded
the unprotected conduct (the carrying out of the protocols) in
the chain of events leading to injury. Indeed, the outcome of
the decision establishing testing protocols was a "but for" cause
of the injuries; negligent testing would not have occurred but
for the decision to test at all. Berkovitz thus makes clear that,
even though the decision establishing testing protocols was pro-
tected conduct that "caused" the negligent testing to occur, the
plaintiffs could "base" their claim on the subsequent, negligent
testing. That claim was not, Berkovitz suggests, based upon the
antecedent decision to conduct the testing."°
1 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 546-47 (1986) (discussing Court's find-
ing that regulation of polio vaccine was discretionary function).
See id. at 546-48 (failure to perform required test is not permissible exercise of policy
discretion).
" See id. (holding that it was improper to dismiss claim regarding application of safety
standards for vaccine release because plaintiffs might show that such application did not
involve protected discretion). The text of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) - specifically, the clause
preceding the clause that sets forth the discretionary function exception - reinforces the
suggestion in Berkovitz that unprotected, negligent conduct should not be regarded as
based upon prior, protected conduct merely because it implements the prior, protected
conduct. See supra note 2 (quoting text of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). The discretionary function
exception is set forth in the second clause of § 2680(a). The first clause bars "[a]ny claim
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in
the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be val-
id." § 2680(a). The negative implication of the first clause is that the exception does not
bar a claim that an official has failed to exercise due care in the execution of a statute or
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Berkovitz also suggests that a claim is not based upon protect-
ed conduct merely because a tort award on that claim could
affect executive-branch policymaking. If the government were
held liable in Berkovitz for the negligence of an FDA scientist,
the executive branch might well change the way it regulates
polio vaccine production. For example, it might deregulate the
industry, so that testing was done by the industry, rather than
the government. Then the industry, not the government, would
be liable for negligent testing. Alternatively, the executive
branch might give FDA scientists more discretion over what tests
to perform. In that event, Gaubert would lead courts to find that
the "street-level" scientists themselves exercised protected discre-
tion in performing the tests; °' their actions would thereby gen-
erally be protected by the exception. A decision to deregulate
the industry or to give lab officials more discretion would clearly
constitute the exercise of a discretionary function. The possibility
that such decisions might be made in response to tort liability
- a possibility that the government specifically called to the
regulation. The same implication logically extends to claims based on a lack of due care in
the execution of agency prescriptions that are not set forth in a statute or regulation, but
that have been formulated through the exercise of a discretionary function (such as rules
established through informal agency guidelines and informal or formal adjudications).
Thus, in light of the first clause, the exception should not be construed to bar claims based
on the negligent implementation of a discretionary function. By the same token, as Profes-
sor Peck explained, the first clause implies that a claim should be barred if the allegedly
wrongful conduct was that of an official who implemented a discretionary function while
exercising due care. See Peck, supra note 4, at 230-31. Professor Peck argued that such a
claim should be regarded as being based upon the antecedent exercise of a discretionary
function. See id. Professor Rogers endorsed Professor Peck's argument in a later article, see
Rogers, supra note 4, at 821-22, and so do I. "Due care" would presumably be established,
in the first instance, if the allegedly wrongful conduct was specifically directed by the offi-
cial who exercised the discretionary function. See Peck, supra note 4, at 230-31. In the ab-
sence of such a specific directive, a court would have to rely on federal common law to
determine "due care." See Hydrogen Tech. Corp. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1160-61
(1st Cir. 1987).
'0' See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) (arguing that if employee
obeys direction of mandatory regulation, government will be protected because action is in
furtherance of regulation's policies).
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Court's attention in Berkovitz' ° - did not affect the outcome
in that case.
01
Berkovitz's implications for the "based upon" issue run counter
to the broader implications of Dalehite. Dalehite has been criti-
cized as reflecting an overly expansive interpretation of the
statutory term "discretionary function.""° The decision may be
better understood, however, as reflecting an expansive interpre-
tation of the statutory term "based upon." So understood, the
decision held that all of the claims - even claims involving
actions by low-level officials without policymaking authority -
were based upon the government's decision to initiate a fertiliz-
er production program in the first place. The Dalehite Court
suggested a rationale for such an interpretation by emphasizing
that all of the allegedly negligent actions occurred in the course
of implementing the program.0 5 As discussed above, however,
that suggestion was superseded by the suggestion in Bekovitz that
the exception does not protect negligent conduct merely be-
cause that conduct implemented an antecedent decision based
on public policy.
While Berkovitz thus negates the broad implications of Dalehite
for the "based upon" issue, Gaubert tends to confirm Dalehite's
narrower implications. Read most narrowly, Dalehite implied that
a claim ostensibly based upon unprotected conduct might be
deemed also to be based upon protected conduct if there is a
" The government argued in Be,*ovitz that the imposition of tort liability for a govern-
ment scientist's violation of mandatory testing procedures might cause the government
either to modify the testing guidelines to afford greater discretion to government scientists
or to allow the industry to do the testing. See Brief for Respondents at 27-28, Be,*ovitz, 486
U.S. 531 (discussing consequences on regulatory action if tort remedy is allowed).
10 Cf Krent, supra note 63, at 1549 (stating that "a finding of liability in Dalehite might
have chilled the government's willingness to continue shipping aid overseas. A comparable
finding in Vaig Airlines might have deterred the government from inspecting aircraft at
all.").
o' See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 52, at 114 & n.34 (Dalehite "interpret[ed] the exception
to immunize routine low-level implementation of high-level policy decisions"); Peck, supra
note 4, at 215-16 (noting, with disapproval, that DaLekhite Court took broader position than
that urged by government, which had argued that "every act or omission which we claim to
be covered by the 'discretionary' exception must involve, in itself and not merely by par-
entage or affiliation, a discretionary function"); see also 5 KENNETH CuLP DAviS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27:12, at 67 (2d ed. 1984) (criticizing Dalehite's conclusion that
storage and loading of fertilizer involved protected discretion).
" See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953) (holding that initiating pro-
grams and activities is discretionary and, therefore, cannot form basis of suit under FTCA).
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strong enough connection between the unprotected conduct
and the protected conduct. Gaubert tends to confirm that impli-
cation by holding that the exception applied to some activities
that, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurrence, did not
themselves appear to involve protected conduct, but were closely
related to protected conduct."° Justice Scalia cited as an exam-
ple the majority's holding that the exception barred the claim
that bank regulators "acted negligently in selecting consultants
to advise the bank.""° As the concurrence observed, "[i]t re-
mains to be determined whether the choice [of a consultant] is
of a policymaking nature.""8  The concurrence nonetheless
agreed that the claim based on that conduct was barred by the
exception because it was so closely connected with "the decision
whether or not to take over [the] bank," which "surely" was
protected by the exception." The concurrence explained that
all of the regulators' actions were "recommendations" that the
bank had to follow to avoid a government takeover."' They
were therefore tantamount to the setting of conditions under
which the government would or would not take over the bank
- clearly a discretionary function.''
Together, Berkovitz, Dalehite, and Gaubert imply the following
for the "based upon" issue: A claim is presumptively based upon
the government conduct that the plaintiff alleges was wrongful
and proximately caused the injuries. That presumption is not
conclusive, however. A claim ostensibly based upon unprotected
conduct may also be based upon protected conduct if there is a
sufficient connection between the unprotected conduct and the
protected conduct. It is not sufficient that the unprotected con-
duct merely occurred in the course of implementing the policy
decision underlying the protected conduct. Nor is it sufficient
See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 334, 338-39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that it was
speculative whether individual acts of government officials challenged by plaintiffs were
susceptible to policy considerations, but that those acts were nonetheless protected by dis-
cretionary function exception).
'" See i&. at 337.
log Id.
09 See id. at 338.
1o See id.
. See id. at 338-39.
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that an award of liability could influence the manner in which
the government exercises a discretionary function.
The Court's decisions do not indicate precisely what connec-
tion is sufficient for a claim ostensibly based upon unprotected
conduct to be based upon protected conduct. And it is worth
repeating that the Court has not yet addressed the based upon
issue. As discussed in the balance of this Article, however, the
based upon issue may arise in a wide variety of factual settings
that have been the subject of lower federal court decisions.
Moreover, the issue has usually been resolved by the lower
courts without careful consideration or consistent results. The
issue is therefore one likely to require the Court's attention
before long.1
2
"' As noted above, see supra note 28, the Court has had to address the meaning of the
term "based upon" as it is used in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).
See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1993). In that case, Mr. Nelson and his
wife sued the Saudi Arabian government in a United States federal court, alleging that
Saudi police tortured and imprisoned Mr. Nelson for raising safety concerns at the govern-
ment hospital in Saudi Arabia where he worked. See id. at 351-54. The Nelsons relied on
the provision of the FSIA that abrogates foreign sovereign immunity from actions "based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state." Id. at 356
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)) (emphasis added). The Nelsons argued that their claim
was based upon the recruiting activities that led Mr. Nelson to take the hospital job in
Saudi Arabia; those recruiting activities had been carried on in the United States by an
agent of the Saudi government. See id. at 351-54. The Court rejected the Nelsons' argu-
ment, holding that the action was, instead, based upon the torts that later occurred in
Saudi Arabia and that did not, the Court further held, constitute "commercial activity." See
id. at 356-63. The Court concluded: "Those torts, and not the arguably commercial activi-
ties that preceded their commission, form the basis for the Nelsons' suit" Id. at 358. In so
concluding, the Court relied in part on the context in which the term "based upon" is used
in the FSIA. See id. at 357-58. Because of the Court's reliance on the statutory context in
which the term occurred, Nelson does not control the meaning of that term for purposes of
the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. Nonetheless, the Court in Nelson also
relied on the "natural meaning" of the term "based upon"; the Court understood the term
to mean "those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under
his theory of the case" - the "gravamen of the complaint" - and to exclude actions that
"preceded" the allegedly wrongful acts. Id. (quoting Callejo v. Bancomer, SA, 764 F.2d
1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985)). To the extent that Nelson relied on the "natural meaning" of
the term "based upon," it has implications for the meaning of the term as it is used in the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Specifically, it implies that an FTCA claim is
not based upon the exercise of a discretionary function if such exercise "preceded" the
allegedly wrongful conduct See id. at 358. As discussed infra note 223, that implication does
not conflict with the approach proposed here. Nelson does, in contrast, cast doubt on the
view, first proposed by Professor Peck and endorsed by Professor Rogers and me, that a
claim may be based upon the exercise of a discretionary function that occurred before the
allegedly wrongful conduct See supra note 100 (discussing Professor Peck's interpretation of
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III. F/SHER BROTHERS SALES, INC. V. UNITED STATFS
A. Factual and Procedural History
The only decision to date to address the "based upon" lan-
guage is the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Fisher Brothers
Sales, Inc. v. United States."3 Fisher Brothers arose from the "Great
Grape Scare of 1989." n4 The scare began with an anonymous
telephone call to the U.S. embassy in Chile. The caller claimed
that Chilean grapes bound for the United States had been in-
jected with cyanide. In response to the call, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) began closely inspecting Chilean grapes
coming into the United States. It found some grapes that tested
positive for cyanide at an FDA laboratory in Philadelphia, but
that later tested negative at an FDA lab in Cincinnati. Faced
with these conflicting test results, the Commissioner of the FDA
decided to take protective measures. He temporarily banned the
importation of Chilean grapes; he had all Chilean grapes that
were already in the country taken off the shelves; and he made
a public statement reporting the anonymous threats of cyanide
contamination."' The ban was lifted after a few days because
no further cyanide was found. 6 The Chilean economy suf-
fered badly in the meantime, however, partly because other
countries, such as Canada, followed suit by imposing their own
bans on the grapes."'
the exception).
" 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert den/ed, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
14 See generally HERBERT BURKHOLz, THE FDA FOLLIES 99-106 (1994) (discussing FDA's
response to Great Grape Scare of 1989); Bruce Ingersoll, Report Shows Hoax May Have
Caused Grape Scare of 1989, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at B5 (discussing effect of anony-
mous phone call on FDA's response to Grape Scare).
1' See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 282-83 (describing facts leading up to Great Grape Scare
and FDA's response).
116 See generally Marlene Cimons, Chile, World Bank to Compensate for Fruit Ban Losses, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1989, at 4 (business section) (stating that FDA grape ban lasted five days);
Marlene Cimons, US. Firees Chile Grapes, Berries, But Other Fruit Held by Mardets, Distributors,
Must Be Destroyed, LA TIMES, Mar. 18, 1989, at Al (same); Richard Gibson & Bruce
Ingersoll, Politics and Policy: FDA Seeks Safe Way to Release for Sale Tons of Quarantined Fruit
from Chile, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1989, 1989 WL-WSJ 490265 (quoting statement by FDA
official that, after initial evidence of cyanide contamination, no further evidence was
found).
17 See Ingersoll, supra note 114, at B5 (reporting that grape ban resulted in $333
million loss to Chilean economy); Trade Winds, FREE CHINA J., Mar. 27, 1989, at 7 (stating
that Canada, Japan, and other countries followed United States's lead on embargo).
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Chilean-grape growers, shippers, and importers (collectively
"Fisher Brothers") sued the federal government under the FTCA
for more than $210 million in damages."8 They claimed that
they were not challenging the Commissioner's decision to with-
draw the grapes from the market. Instead, they claimed to be
challenging the antecedent FDA laboratory testing of the grapes
in Philadelphia."' They did not dispute that the
Commissioner's decision constituted protected conduct. They
contended that the Philadelphia lab testing was not protected,
however, because the lab technicians failed to follow mandatory
FDA lab procedures.'2 The government moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that it was barred by the discretionary
function exception. The district court granted the government's
motion. It reasoned that the FDA had the discretion to act
during the Chilean grape crisis, and that its exercise of that
discretion was "grounded in the policy of protecting the public
health."'
2 '
A divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
the action was not barred by the discretionary function excep-
tion." Writing for the panel majority, Judge Roth criticized
the district court for analyzing "the conduct of the FDA as a
whole." That approach "misapprehend[ed] the precise na-
ture of plaintiffs' claims," which focused on the events in the
laboratory. 24 The panel majority considered it "not relevant"
whether the Commissioner's decision to withdraw grapes from
the market involved protected discretion.2" In the court's view,
"' See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d at 283; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 17,Julia Saavedra Balmaceda, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-1722) [hereinafter Balmaceda Pet. App.].
n See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 285-86.
"2 See id. at 286 (explaining that claim was based on laboratory procedure and not on
FDA Commissioner's decision to embargo grapes).
' Balmaceda v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
' See Balmaceda Pet. App., supra note 118, at 28a-49a (reproducing panel opinion,
which is not officially reported).
"' See id, at 37a.
" See id. at 38a.
" See id. at 39a.
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that decision was relevant only to determine whether the negli-
gent testing of the grapes was the legal cause of the harm to
plaintiffs."
Judge Stapleton dissented. He found the Commissioner's deci-
sion to be "undeniably a policy one made by an official of the
executive branch exercising a discretionary function."" He did
not believe that the plaintiffs should be able "to escape this
indisputable fact by looking behind the injury-causing decision
and finding fault with an aspect of the data on which it may
have been based." 28
The en banc Third Circuit, by a seven-to-six vote, reversed the
panel and affirmed the dismissal on discretionary function
grounds."2 Judge Stapleton, author of the panel dissent, wrote
the opinion for the en banc majority.3'
For the first time in the case, and apparently for the first
time in any published opinion by a federal court, the en banc
majority's opinion focused on the statutory phrase "based upon."
At the outset, the court stated:
We reject [Fisher Brothers'] attempt to circumvent the discre-
tionary function exception, concluding that if the discretion-
ary function exception to the FTCA is to fulfill its clear and
important purpose, a claim must be "based upon" the exer-
cise of a discretionary function whenever the immediate cause
of the plaintiff's injury is a decision which is susceptible of
policy analysis and which is made by an official legally autho-
rized to make it."'
Later, the court reiterated that Fisher Brothers' claims were
based upon the Commissioner's decision, rather than the ante-
cedent laboratory testing, because the Commissioner's decision
was the real cause of Fisher Brothers' injuries. Concluding that
"[a]ny other view would defeat the purpose of the discretionary
function exception,""2 the court explained:
" See id. at 39a n.3.
Id. at 45a (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
128 1&
I See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 49
(1995).
'" See id. at 281. Judge Stapleton's majority opinion was joined by Judges Sloviter,
Mansmann, Greenberg, Cowen, Nygaard, and Alito. Id.
" Id. at 282.
11 Id. at 286.
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In situations like this where the injury complained of is
caused by a regulatory policy decision, the fact of the matter
is that there is no difference in the quality or quantity of the
interference occasioned by judicial second guessing, whether
the plaintiff purports to be attacking the data base on which
the policy is founded or acknowledges outright that he or
she is challenging the policy itself.'"
If claims could be predicated on negligent data gathering, the
court reasoned,
federal courts, of necessity, would be required to examine in
detail the decisionmaking process of the policymaker to de-
termine what role the challenged data played in the
policymaking .... Without such an examination and all of
the discovery that would necessarily precede it, a plaintiff in
the position of these plaintiffs would be unable to prove a.
causal link between the alleged negligence and the alleged
injury.1
3 4
Believing that the social cost of permitting such judicial inquiry
into policymaking would be prohibitive,"s the en banc majority
identified three components of that cost. First, because policy
decisions by federal officials may affect a "potentially staggering"
number of people, lawsuits concerning those decisions expose
the government to "virtually unlimited" liability."s The second
component of social cost was imposed by the demands of the
litigation on the time and attention of high-level
decisionmakers. 37 The third component of social cost arose
from "the impact upon policymakers that would result from the
fear of virtually unlimited liability and the prospect of virtually
interminable litigation.""' s The majority concluded that "the
discretionary function exception was intended to make sure
every Commissioner's judgment will not be skewed by such con-
siderations."19
The en banc dissent did not address the "based upon" issue.
Instead, it implicitly assumed that Fisher Brothers' claims were
133 Id.
34 Id.
11 See id. at 286-87.
'36 See id. at 286.
'-7 See id. at 286-87.
'3 Id. at 287.
139 Id.
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based upon the allegedly negligent lab testing.' The dissent
apparently based this assumption on the complaint's allegation
that negligent lab testing was the proximate cause of Fisher
Brothers' injuries."" Thus, the dissent: (1) equated the "based
upon" inquiry to a "proximate cause" inquiry; and (2) treated
the plaintiffs' allegation of proximate cause as controlling. Con-
sistent with its implicit determination that the claim was based
upon the allegedly negligent lab testing, the dissent focused on
whether that testing was a discretionary function." The dissent
readily decided that it was not. 4' The dissent observed that
"judgment guided purely by scientific or other objective princi-
ples does not involve discretion for the purposes of the discre-
tionary function exception."' The dissent accepted Fisher
Brothers' allegation that such "objective principles" guided the
procedures for testing the grapes."
The dissent considered it irrelevant that the testing was both
preceded and followed by exercises of discretionary functions:
namely, the Commissioner's initial decision to order the testing
and his later decision (in light of the test results) to withdraw
grapes from the market.'" As to the Commissioner's decision
to order testing, the dissent reasoned that "once the FDA exer-
cised its discretion to test incoming Chilean fruit, it incurred the
obligation to use due care in doing so."' As to the
Commissioner's decision to take the fruit off the market, the
discretionary nature of that decision led the dissent to question
plaintiffs' ability to prove that the alleged negligence of the lab
technicians, rather than the Commissioner's decision, was the
proximate cause of their injuries.'" That factor "had no place,"
14' See id. at 288, 290 (Roth, J., dissenting) (analyzing whether "negligently performed
laboratory work" was discretionary function).
1 See id. at 289 (Roth, J., dissenting) (accepting as true all factual allegations in com-
plaint when considering motion to dismiss).
"' See id. at 289-90 (Roth, J., dissenting) (concluding that laboratory testing was not
discretionary function).
' See id. (holding lab testing not discretionary).
144 Id at 290 (Roth, J., dissenting).
14 See id. at 289-90 (Roth, J., dissenting) (finding that technicians used objective, scien-
tific standards in testing).
14See id. at 290-91 (Roth, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 291 (Roth, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 291 n.1 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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however, in what the dissent regarded as the proper analysis of
the discretionary function issue.49 The dissent was "not per-
suaded" that the imposition of liability would "have an undesir-
able effect on policymakers ... in a position analogous to that
of the FDA Commissioner." 5
B. Analysis of the Approaches in Fisher Brothers to
Resolving the "Based Upon" Issue
1. The Approach of the Fisher Brothers Dissent
As discussed above, the en banc dissent in Fisher Brothers im-
plicitly concluded that Fisher Brothers' claim was based upon
negligent lab testing because that is what Fisher Brothers alleged
was the proximate cause of its injuries. 15' The dissent's conclu-
sion relied in part on Bei*ovitz, where the Supreme Court simi-
larly assumed that the claim before it was based upon the con-
duct that was allegedly wrongful and injurious.'52 As discussed
below, however, the dissent's reliance on Berkovitz was unjusti-
fied.
153
The dissent also rested on two propositions: (1) that the court
of appeals was bound to accept plaintiffs' proximate cause alle-
gation; and (2) that a claim is based upon the conduct that
proximately caused the injuries. Those propositions are ex-
amined below as well.
55
a. The Dissent's Reliance on Berkovitz
The dissent remarked that the negligent laboratory testing was
not protected merely because the Commissioner exercised a
discretionary function in ordering the tests in the first place.
149 See id.
1- Id. at 291 (Roth, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 288-90 (Roth, J., dissenting) (analyzing whether laboratory testing was dis-
cretionary function).
"' See id. (interpreting BeTovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988), as standing
for proposition that court must accept such allegations of complaint as true).
"' See infra Part IlI.B.la (discussing Fisher Brothers court's unjustified reliance on
Berkovitz).
e Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 289, 291 n.1 (Roth, J., dissenting).
'~ See infra Part III.B.l.b.
' See Fsher Bros., 46 F.3d at 290-91 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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That remark was correct but irrelevant.' Its correctness is
established by Berkovitz.1' As discussed above, Berkovitz held
that the government was liable for the negligent application of
the criteria for releasing polio vaccine, even though the develop-
ment of those criteria constituted a discretionary function."
The dissent's remark was irrelevant, however, because the gov-
ernment did not base its discretionary function argument, and
the majority did not base its judgment, on the Commissioner's
decision to order the testing of grapes. 1" They relied instead
on the Commissioner's decision, after the testing, to withdraw
the grapes from the market.' By focusing on the protected
conduct that preceded the allegedly negligent, unprotected lab
testing, the dissent ignored the later, protected conduct that
intervened between the unprotected conduct and the injuries.
In Berkovitz, unlike Fisher Brothers, there was no intervening
exercise of a discretionary function between the allegedly negli-
gent conduct and the alleged injuries.6 ' While the dissent ig-
nored that distinction, the majority considered it a "critical"
one. 6 The dissent's disregard is most glaring when it criticizes
' The dissent erred, however, in concluding that the decision to conduct the test
created a duty to use due care in testing. See i& at 291 (Roth, J., dissenting). That state-
ment fails to distinguish between the issue of whether the testing constituted the exercise
of a discretionary function, which is a question of federal law concerning the scope of
sovereign immunity; and the quite different issue of whether a private entity in the
government's situation would owe a duty of care to plaintiffs, which is a question of state
law concerning substantive liability in tort. See Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 34
F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding Good Samaritan doctrine of tort law inapplicable
to discretionary function exception).
I" See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (outlining principles that
govern determination of discretionary function exception).
" See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Be,*ovitz).
160 See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286 (holding that plaintiffs' injuries were caused by
Commissioner's decisions; therefore, plaintiffs' claims were based upon those decisions).
63. See id. at 286-87 (focusing on potential for tort liability to affect Commissioner's
future decisionmaking).
362 See Ber*oviz, 486 U.S. at 547-48 (holding discretionary function exception inapplica-
ble because policy did not permit discretionary release of polio vaccine). Plaintiffs in
Berkovitz alleged that the release of a vaccine lot depended solely on whether it satisfied the
laboratory tests; government officials had no discretion either to approve the public release
of lots that failed the laboratory tests or to disapprove the public release of lots that passed
the tests. See id.; see also Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 287 (distinguishing Ber*ovitz).
'6' See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 287 (arguing that unlike Ber*ovitz, Fisher Brothers involved
congressional and FDA authorization for Commissioner to make discretionary decisions
regarding quarantine for public health).
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the majority's view that the imposition of tort liability could
skew policymaking by future FDA Commissioners."84 The dis-
sent argued that liability would not have consequences "of a
different nature or to a greater extent than" that in Berkovitz.'"
In support of that argument, the dissent referred solely to the
Commissioner's decision to test the grapes.' The dissent rea-
soned that imposing liability in the case before it could have the
laudable effect of discouraging future Commissioners from or-
dering laboratory testing in similar situations unless they were
confident that the testing would be performed non-negligent-
ly.'67 Implicit in that reasoning is the belief that future Com-
missioners would want to rely on testing in such situations and
would therefore have an incentive to ensure that testing was
performed properly. The dissent's reasoning is plausible as far as
it goes, but it does not go far enough. The dissent ignores the
effect that imposing liability could have on decisionmaking by
future Commissioners after the receipt of test results. By ignoring
that aspect of the case, the dissent avoided the fact that distin-
guished the case before it from Berkovitz and that underlay the
majority's decision.
b. The Dissent's Reliance on Plaintiffs' Proximate
Cause Allegations
The procedural posture of the case did not justify the
dissent's view that Fisher Brothers' proximate cause allegation
conclusively determined what act its claim was based upon.
There are, moreover, affirmative reasons not to treat a plaintiff's
proximate cause allegation as controlling the "based upon" issue.
That is true even if one assumes that, in barring claims based
upon the exercise of a discretionary function, Congress intended
to bar claims proximately caused by such an exercise.
On review of an order dismissing a complaint, an appellate
court must accept the truth of only the factual allegations in the
' See id. at 291 (Roth, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt that imposing liability would
have the sort of chilling effect on government decisionmaking that discretionary function
exception was intended to prevent).
16 id.
"6 See id. at 290 (Roth, J., dissenting).
'7 Id. at 291-92 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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complaint." The issue of proximate cause is not a question of
fact. Rather, it is a mixed question of fact and law;"tu it in-
volves determining whether a set of facts satisfies a legal stan-
dard 70  A court of appeals is not required to accept a
plaintiff's legal assertions as to what was the proximate cause of
the injuries.' The dissent therefore erred by relying on the
procedural posture of the case as a basis for deeming the law-
suit to be based upon lab negligence.
Furthermore, if a plaintiffs proximate cause allegation con-
trolled the "based upon" issue, plaintiffs could often avoid the
discretionary function exception by artful pleading.'n The po-
tential for abuse is clear when one recognizes that most policy-
based decisions are based in part on information gathered by
others. The information may often be incomplete or inaccurate
in certain ways. Many plaintiffs, therefore, can argue that inju-
ries resulting from a policy-based decision were based upon
faulty information, the gathering of which, because routine, will
be unprotected.
The artful pleading problem is not the only reason to reject
the dissent's approach. Assume that Congress intended the term
"based upon" to mean "proximately caused by." Even if the
plaintiff correctly identifies unprotected conduct as a proximate
cause in his allegations, that does not preclude the possibility
1"' See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991) (accepting factual allega-
tions in plaintiff's complaint as true when deciding motion to dismiss).
" See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.SA. v. Sofec, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1813, 1819 (1996) (holding that
issue of proximate cause involves application of law to facts).
70 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996) (defining mixed ques-
tion of law and fact as one that involves application of legal standard to facts before court).
1' See generaly id. (holding that independent appellate review of probable cause is war-
ranted because it is mixed question of law and fact).
" Cf. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 609-10 (1986) (barring action under Flood
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 702c, despite plaintiffs' argument that their claim concerned, not
government management of flood control project, but government management of recre-
ational lands on which flood project was located); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,
284-85 (1983) (stating that limitations on waiver of sovereign immunity effected by Quiet
Title Act cannot be avoided by suing individual federal officer instead of suing govern-
ment); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 703 (1961) (rejecting the argument that 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h), which bars claims arising out of negligent misrepresentation, "does not
apply... when the claim is phrased as one 'arising out of' negligence rather than
.misrepresentation'"); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-
88 (1949) (naming official, rather than government, as defendant did not avoid sovereign-
immunity bar).
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that other, protected government conduct also was a proximate
cause. As discussed above, injuries at the hands of the govern-
ment may have multiple causes.1 73 Assuming that "based upon"
means "proximately caused by," the exception does not require
the protected conduct to be the sole proximate cause for a claim
to be barred; a claim is barred if protected conduct was a proxi-
mate cause. Recast in statutory terms, the exception applies
whenever a claim is based upon protected conduct, even if the
claim is also based upon unprotected conduct. For that reason, a
court should not decide the "based upon" issue solely by refer-
ence to the conduct that the plaintiff alleges was "the" proxi-
mate cause.
17 4
2. The Approach of the Fisher Brothers Majority
The Fisher Brothers majority was correct, when deciding the
"based upon" issue, not to rely on the plaintiffs' allegation of
proximate cause; the majority was incorrect, however, in adopt-
ing an "immediate cause" standard to decide that issue. Under
the proper approach, the claim in Fisher Brothers was based upon
the Commissioner's decision to withdraw grapes from the mar-
ket because, to establish proximate cause, Fisher Brothers would
have had to prove that negligent lab testing influenced the
173 See supra Part I.B.1. ,
171 It is not clear whether Congress meant "based upon" to mean "proximately caused
by." In contrast to its use of "based upon" in the discretionary function exception, Congress
used other language, arguably more suggestive of proximate causation, in two other FTCA
exceptions. One such exception bars "[a]ny claim for damages caused by the imposition of a
quarantine by the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(0 (1994) (emphasis added). See also id
§ 2680(i) (refusing to extend FTCA to "[any claim for damages caused by the fiscal opera-
tions of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system"). The remaining FTCA
exceptions bar claims "arising" out of certain governmental activities. See id. § 2680(b)
(barring claims "arising out of" loss or mistransmission of mail); id. § 2680(c) (barring
claims "arising in respect of" collection or assessment of taxes and customs or detention of
merchandise); id. § 2680(e) (barring claims "arising out of" certain national defense activi-
ties); id. § 2680(h) (barring claims "arising out of" certain intentional torts); id. § 2680(j)
(barring claims "arising out of" combatant activities in wartime); id. § 2680(k) (barring
claims "arising in" foreign country); id. § 2680(1) (barring claims "arising from" activities of
Tennessee Valley Authority); id. § 2680(m) (barring claims "arising from" activities of Pana-
ma Canal Company); id. § 2680(n) (barring claims "arising from" activities of certain feder-
al banking entities). Ultimately, however, there is no apparent rhyme or reason to the
varying formulations used in the exceptions. Thus, it is difficult to conclude confidently
that Congress meant the "based upon" inquiry to be a proximate-cause analysis.
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Commissioner's decision. To evaluate such proof, a court would
have had to scrutinize the basis for the Commissioner's decision.
The majority in Fisher Brothers reasonably concluded that the
discretionary function exception bars judicial scrutiny of the
basis for exercising a discretionary function. 75
a. The Majority's "Immediate Cause" Standard
The en banc majority in Fisher Brothers held that the claim was
based upon the FDA Commissioner's decision to withdraw Chil-
ean grapes from the domestic market because that decision was
the "immediate cause" of the plaintiffs' injuries. 76  The
majority's reasoning does not support an immediate cause stan-
dard.
The majority sought to avoid judicial scrutiny of the
Commissioner's decisionmaking process." It pointed out that
such scrutiny would be required if Fisher Brothers' claim, which
alleged laboratory negligence, went forward. To state a claim
in tort, Fisher Brothers had to allege that the laboratory negli-
gence proximately caused its injuries and, to recover, it had to
prove that causal connection." That proof necessarily included
proof that the results of the negligent lab tests influenced the
FDA Commissioner's decision to withdraw Chilean grapes from
the domestic market."8  Specifically, Fisher Brothers had to
17 See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991), as foreclosing inquiries
into official's subjective intent when exercising discretion), cel. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
76 See id. "Immediate cause" means "[t]he last of a series or chain of causes tending to
a given result, and which, of itself, and without the intervention of any further cause, di-
rectly produces the result or event." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990). "Immedi-
ate cause" differs from "proximate cause" which is "that which in a natural and continuous
sequence... produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." Id.
at 1225. The "proximate cause" may be followed by other causal factors; if so, the "proxi-
mate cause" is not the "immediate cause." See id.; PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra
note 7, § 42, at 276-77 (discussing "nearest cause").
'7 See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286 (without extensive discovery of Commissioner's deci-
sionmaking process, plaintiffs would be unable to prove causal link, and such discovery
could skew decisionmaking process).
178 See id. at 286; see also id. at 288 (stating that "litigation of [Fisher Brothers' claims]
will require extensive inquiry into the process by which [the Commissioner's] decisions
were made").
" See supra note 7 (discussing "proximate cause" requirement of tort law).
"S0 See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286 (stating that examination of role data played in influ-
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prove: (1) that the lab technician's departure from the standard
of care led to a false-positive test result, and (2) that the false-
positive result increased the probability that the Commissioner
would decide to withdraw grapes from the market, relative to
the probability that he would have come to that decision if the
test result had (correctly) turned out negative. To assess that
proof, and thereby determine whether Fisher Brothers had es-
tablished proximate cause, a court would be required to scruti-
nize the basis of the Commissioner's decision. In other words, it
would have to examine the basis for an official's exercise of a
discretionary function. The majority believed that "this is precise-
ly the kind of inquiry that the Supreme Court sought to fore-




Assume, for now, that Congress did indeed intend the excep-
tion to prevent the kind of judicial scrutiny with which the ma-
jority was concerned.8 If so, then the exception should apply
whenever a plaintiff must, in order to establish proximate causa-
tion, prove that the allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct
influenced the way in which a discretionary function was exer-
cised. The situation in which the exception should apply under
the majority's reasoning, described schematically, is as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that unprotected conduct (U) proximately
caused her to suffer injuries (I); included in the chain of causa-
tion leading from U to I is the exercise of a discretionary func-
tion (protected conduct: P); in order to establish the required
casual connection between U and I, plaintiff must prove a partic-
ular kind of causal connection between U and P: namely, that U
influenced the substance of P. A court must determine what
role U played in P to decide whether U proximately caused .
The Fisher Brothers majority believed that such a determination is
barred by the discretionary function exception. 8
encing decision is necessary for plaintiff to prove causation); id. at 289 (Roth, J., dissent-
ing) (Fisher Brothers alleged that "the decision to withdraw Chilean fruit from the market
was proximately caused by the positive test results").
t Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286.
82 But see infra notes 184-221 and accompanying text (examining that assumption).
"See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286 (stating that Supreme Court's interpretation of discre-
tionary function foreclosed inquiry into exercise of official's discretion).
733
University of California, Davis
If the majority correctly understood the purpose of the excep-
tion, it erred in two ways by using an "immediate cause" stan-
dard. First, the "immediate cause" standard requires courts to
determine the actual cause or causes of the plaintiffs injuries.
This is unnecessary; courts need only examine the plaintiff's
allegations of how the allegedly wrongful conduct caused the
injuries. It will be clear from those allegations whether the court
will have to assess the influence of unprotected conduct upon
protected conduct. Second, the "immediate cause" standard
focuses exclusively on the strength of the causal connection
between the protected conduct and the injuries (between P and
1). To be sure, that connection is relevant to identifying cases
requiring the kind of judicial scrutiny that the majority wanted
to avoid; in all such cases, plaintiffs will allege that such a con-
nection exists. But the need for forbidden scrutiny arises only
when a plaintiff also alleges a causal connection between the
allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct and the protected con-
duct (between U and P). Specifically, when the plaintiff alleges
that unprotected conduct influenced protected conduct, a court
will have to examine the basis for the protected conduct, regard-
less whether the protected conduct was the actual or immediate
cause of the injuries.
In sum, the reasoning of the Fisher Brothers majority supports a
simple standard for identifying cases in which a court would
have to scrutinize the way in which a discretionary function was
exercised. Such scrutiny will be necessary when, in order to
establish proximate causation, the plaintiff must prove that the
allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct influenced the way in
which a discretionary function was exercised. This "influence"
standard will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, below.
Hereafter, a case in which the proposed approach is satisfied -
a case in which the plaintiff must, in order to establish proxi-
mate cause, show that the allegedly wrongful, unprotected con-
duct influenced the way in which a discretionary function was
exercised - is referred to as a "Fisher Brothers-type" action.
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b. The Majority's Understanding of the Purpose of the
Discretionay Function Exception
In suggesting the use of an "influence" standard for resolving
the "based upon" issue, it was assumed that the discretionary
function exception prevents a court from scrutinizing the basis
for protected conduct. Now we must examine that assumption.
This section argues that the assumption reflects a reasonable
understanding of the purpose of the exception.
i. Whether the Exception Prevents Only the
"Judgmental" Judicial Scrutiny' That Occurs in a Direct
Challenge to the Exercise of a Discretionary Function
As an initial matter, it is not obvious that the discretionary
function exception prevents the kind of judicial scrutiny that the
Fisher Brothers majority wanted to avoid. The majority wanted to
avoid judicial inquiry into whether and to what extent the Com-
missioner relied on the results of the Philadelphia lab tests.'
The only purpose of that inquiry would have been to determine
whether laboratory negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs'
injuries." The purpose would not have been to determine
whether the Commissioner's decision was wise.
The type of "nonjudgmental" judicial scrutiny that the majori-
ty wanted to avoid differs from the sort of "second guessing"
that the discretionary function exception is ordinarily under-
stood to prevent." It is different, for example, from the judi-
cial scrutiny that would have occurred if the plaintiffs in Fisher
Brothers had challenged the Commissioner's decision directly, by
alleging that it was wrongful and that it proximately caused their
injuries. That allegation would have required a court to assess
the wisdom of the Commissioner's decision. That assessment is
quite different from an assessment of the role that a particular
datum, such as the Philadelphia test results, played in the
Commissioner's decision. The Fisher Brothers majority therefore
's' See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286, 288.
" See id. at 286.
' See id. at 290 (Roth, J., dissenting) ('if the district court were to adjudicate this case
as it is alleged in the complaint by plaintiffs, the court would not be 'second-guessing' a
policy-based decision").
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erred in saying that the "quality" of judicial scrutiny required to
resolve the claim before it would not differ from that required
to resolve a claim directly challenging the FDA Commissioner's
decision."8 7
The result in Fisher Brothers raises the question: What is it
about claims directly challenging the exercise of a discretionary
function that led Congress to bar them? Is it that, in such a
"direct challenge," a court examines the wisdom of the exercise
of a discretionary function - conducts "judgmental" scrutiny? If
so, Fisher Brothers was wrongly decided (since it applied the ex-
ception to prevent nonjudgmental scrutiny); if not, the decision
may have been correct.
It is quite doubtful that the purpose of the exception is mere-
ly to prevent judicial review of the wisdom of a discretionary
function. Such review occurs under statutes other than the
FTCA all the time. For example, many official actions that con-
stitute the exercise of a discretionary function are subject to
judicial review, including for "abuse of discretion," under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'" Congress passed the
APA and the FTCA in the same year. This fact may reinforce
the notion that the discretionary function exception was not
intended solely to keep courts from reviewing the wisdom of
discretionary decisions. To be sure, in APA-type actions, courts
must defer to many aspects of executive decisionmaking.'8 9 But
See id. at 286.
"' See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agen-
cy action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.");
id. § 706(2) (A) (authorizing court to 'hold unlawful and set aside" agency decisions found
to be "an abuse of discretion"); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (APA
reflects "basic presumption of review" of administrative action); see generally, e.g., ALFRED C.
AMAN & WILLim T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 13.2-13.10, at 437-515 (1993) (exam-
ining legal standards set forth in § 706 of the APA to be applied by federal courts when
reviewing agency decisions); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISATIVE LAW § 10.34, at 701-03
(1991) (discussing judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law).
Indeed, questions of mootness aside, the Commissioner's decision in Fisher Brothers was
probably subject to APA review. See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 285 n.1 (citing statutory and
regulatory authority for Commissioner's actions); see generaly Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Califano, 564 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussing reviewability of FDA deci-
sions); cf. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 984 (1986) (reviewing action
brought against FDA).
" See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (recognizing that considerable weight is given to administrative agency's con-
struction of statute that agency is charged with administering).
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similar principles of deference could, and presumably would, be
developed under the FrCA in the absence of the discretionary
function exception."' The availability of APA-type review sup-
ports the conclusion that the purpose of the exception is not
limited to preventing judgmental judicial scrutiny of the exercise
of a discretionary function. 9'
ii. Whether the Exception Also Prevents the
"Nonjudgmental" Judicial Scrutiny That Occurs
in a Fisher Brothers-Type Action
The Fisher Brothers majority determined that three kinds of
social cost are generated by an FTCA action in which a court
must scrutinize the exercise of a discretionary function. First was
the cost of large tort judgments against the government. Second
was the cost of requiring officials who exercise discretionary
functions to defend against FTCA actions. Third was the cost of
having an official's exercise of discretion skewed by her desire
to avoid the first two kinds of costs. The majority reasoned that
these costs arise and are unacceptable, regardless whether the
purpose of the court's scrutiny is to decide if the plaintiff has
established proximate cause (as is required in a Fisher Brothers-
type action) or is, instead, to assess the wisdom of the exercise
of a discretionary function (as is required in a direct chal-
lenge).'9'
For example, in determining whether an official's conduct violated a regulation
(and therefore was unprotected), a court might defer to the agency's interpretation of the
regulation. Cf., e.g., General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.
1984) (in light of agency's expertise, Nuclear Regulatory Commission had protected discre-
tion in determining whether "abnormal occurrence" had taken place so as to trigger statu-
tory reporting requirement); ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1527 ("from the error
minimization vantage point, the exception should be tailored to complement deference
accorded administrative decisions on direct [i.e., APA-type] review").
191 See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1507 (stating, in light of availability of APA-type
review, "[p]lainly, something more than decisional competence is implicated in the discre-
tionary function exception"); id. at 1527 ("By placing beyond the FTCA's purview acts of
the type regularly subject to direct supervision .... Congress signalled its belief that spe-
cial concerns about the effects of a review apply when tort litigation is the vehicle for judi-
cial review.").
,92 See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286-87 (describing social costs of accepting plaintiffs' theo-
ry); supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (describing this portion of Fisher Brthers
opinion).
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The validity of the majority's reasoning depends on the an-
swers to two questions. First, was the exception intended to
prevent the kinds of social cost cited by the majority? Second,
are those costs comparable in both a Fisher Brothers-type action
and a direct challenge?
(A) The Risk of Large Money Judgments
The first cost component - the cost of large tort judgments
- would flow, not from judicial scrutiny of the Commissioner's
decisionmaking, but from the imposition of liability. Such liabili-
ty would have arisen in Fisher Brothers if the court had deter-
mined that the positive lab results from Philadelphia were attrib-
utable to negligence and that those lab results influenced the
Commissioner's decision to withdraw Chilean grapes from the
market. The majority was right to rely on this cost component
only if a Fisher Brothers-type action poses the same risk of a large
money judgment as does a direct challenge, and if Congress
intended the exception to avoid such large judgments.
A Fisher Brothers-type action probably does pose the same risk
of a large money judgment as does a direct challenge. When a
high-level official, with authority to do so, makes a decision
based on considerations of public policy, that decision often
affects many people."'3 Such high-level officials must often rely
on data gathered by low-level officials who lack authority to
consider public policy (and whose conduct is therefore unpro-
tected). Negligence in gathering data can give rise to enormous
damages because it is "amplified" through the subsequent, poli-
cy-based decision. Thus, poor data, as well as poor policy judg-
ments, can lead to large damages.
Congress may well have intended the discretionary function
exception, among other mechanisms, to avoid large money judg-
ments against the United States. The legislative history gives
examples of official conduct that would, as well as official con-
duct that would not, be protected by the exception. The exam-
ples of protected conduct could, if challenged in tort, often lead
to large money judgments;194 the examples of unprotected con-
See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
See H.R. REP. No. 77-2245, at 10 (1942) (exception is "designed to preclude applica-
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duct would, if challenged in tort, usually involve comparatively
small money judgments.'95 Furthermore, other FTCA excep-
tions appear to be designed to bar claims that, if successful,
could lead to large money judgments against the govern-
ment.196
Dean Cass has explained that Congress had good reason to
worry about large money judgments under the FTCA.'97 He
points out that the prospect of recovering a large money judg-
ment from a deep-pocketed defendant tends to encourage the
filing of tort actions with little chance of success.' There is
no defendant with a deeper pocket than the United States, and
the cases cited from the outset of this Article illustrate that cases
involving discretionary functions can threaten huge liability
awards.' Dean Cass has also persuasively argued that the error
costs to the government of FTCA actions involving protected
conduct are greater than the error costs of APA-type actions
involving such conduct.' Whether or not the review is
tion of [FTCA's sovereign immunity waiver] to a claim against a regulatory agency, such as
the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, [and] ...
claims based upon an allegedly negligent exercise by the Treasury Department of the black-
listing or freezing powers"); S. REP. No. 77-1196, at 7 (1942) (same).
'" See S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 31 (1946) (citing "negligence in the operation of vehi-
cles" as example of tort for which recovery was permitted); H.R. REP. No. 79-1287, at 5
(1945) (same); H.R. REP. No. 77-2245, at 7, 10 (1942) (same); see also Kosak v. United
States, 465 U.S. 848, 855 (1984) ("One of the principal purposes of the [FTCA] was to
waive the Government's immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents
in which employees of the Postal Service were at fault.") (footnote omitted); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953) ("Uppermost in the collective mind of Congress [in
enacting the FTCA] were the ordinary common-law torts.") (footnote omitted).
"9 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1994) (barring claims arising from negligent transmis-
sion of mail or other postal matter); id. § 2680(c) (barring claims arising from assessment
or collection of taxes or customs duties); id. § 2680(e) (barring claims arising out of ad-
ministration of Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-31); id. § 2680(i) (barring
claims for damages caused by fiscal operations of Treasury or regulation of monetary sys-
tem); id. § 26800) (barring claims arising out of combatant activities of military during
wartime).
197 See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1519-27; see also Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P.
Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual AUocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L REV.
257, 276-85 (1991) (discussing limited effectiveness of tort liability against government).
'9' See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1523-25 (comparing tort action to playing lottery;
if there is big enough prize, people will participate even though the chance of winning is
quite small).
9 See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing several types of liability
claims against government).
2 See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1519-27. Dean Cass explains that an erroneous
University of California, Davis
nonjudgmental does not appear to affect any components of
that cost differential.
One cannot, however, conclude that the exception bars Fisher
Brothers-type actions merely because they pose the same risk of
large money judgments as do direct challenges. The same "am-
plification" of the effects of low-level negligence may occur
whether or not the later, high-level decision is discretionary.
That is clear when the facts of Fisher Brothers are altered to as-
sume that a statute required the Commissioner to suspend the
importation of any fruit found contaminated during FDA lab
testing. Because the Commissioner would have no discretion to
refrain from suspending imports of the fruit, his decision would
not be protected by the discretionary function exception. The
extent of economic damages flowing from the laboratory negli-
gence would not differ by virtue of the non-discretionary nature
of his decision.
Thus, the majority was justified in relying in part on the com-
parable risk of large money judgments posed by Fisher Brothers-
type actions and direct challenges. But that common feature
does not, standing alone, support the majority's application of
the exception.
award of damages, unlike an erroneous award of prospective relief, confers a windfall on
one party that cannot be recouped by negotiating changes in the other parties' future
conduct. See i& at 1519-20. In addition, he determines that the error costs in damage suits
against the government may be distributed asymmetrically, in a way that disfavors the gov-
ernment. See id. at 1522. The asymmetry may occur, among other reasons, "because the
probable benefits of one course of [government] action may be diffuse and invisible while
its potential costs are concentrated and readily apparent." Id. Dean Cass cites as an exam-
ple the FDA's approval of a new drug. See id. The harm from undue delay in the approval
of a new drug is spread among those who would benefit from the drug; the potential bene-
ficiaries are therefore hard to identify and their harm is nigh imperceptible, consisting of
the absence of a benefit (such as the absence of side effects of the existing drugs for treat-
ing the same condition as the new drug would treat). See id. In contrast, undue speed lead-
ing to the approval of a new drug that has harmful side effects often perceptibly harms an
identifiable group. See id. Consequently, an FDA official may err on the side of delay, espe-
cially if the potential liability of undue speed is large. See id. at 1523. Dean Cass then uses
the analogy of one's decision to purchase a lottery ticket to show that the retroactive na-
ture of damage suits "also increases the amount of litigation, and, particularly where suit is
against the government, it prompts more doubtful suits to be brought and to be pressed
more vigorously." See id. at 1527.
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(B) The Diversion of Time and Energy of
Discretionary Decisionmakers
The majority also relied on the cost of requiring officials who
exercise discretionary functions to defend against FICA actions.
Both Fisher Brothers-type actions and direct challenges entail judi-
cial scrutiny of such officials' conduct. The fact that the scrutiny
is nonjudgmental in the first type does not necessarily mean
that it will consume less of the decisionmaker's time and atten-
tion."°
Congress may have taken these "diversion" costs into account
in enacting the discretionary function exception. The Court has
done so in crafting rules of official immunity. 2 Moreover, it
would be rational for Congress to have taken them into account
in the FTCA context if, as was suggested above, a significant
proportion of both Fisher Brothers-type and direct challenges have
little merit."' The rationality of considering the diversion cost
of FTCA suits would be reinforced by the availability of APA-type
judicial review, as well as congressional oversight, of discretionary
functions by executive branch officials. These forms of review
lessen the need for tort liability to function as a deterrent to
official misconduct.'
Nonetheless, the comparability of diversion costs generated by
Fisher Brothem-type and direct challenges does not add much
"' See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (noting that "there is no difference in the... quantity of interference occasioned by
judicial second guessing, whether the plaintiff purports to be attacking the data base on
which the policy is founded or acknowledges outright that he or she is challenging the
policy itself") (emphasis added), .ert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
'" See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachunan, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (holding that state prosecu-
tors are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
actions in their role as advocates for state). The Court in Imb/er determined that one rea-
son the common law afforded such immunity was so that a prosecutor's "energy and atten-
tion would [not] be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law" to de-
fending against civil actions by resentful defendants. Id. at 425. The Court also observed
that there were other remedies, besides civil liability, for prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at
429.
" See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing factors that tend to en-
courage filing of tort claims against government).
' For that reason, Professor Rogers has argued that the discretionary function excep-
tion should be interpreted to bar any FTCA action that involves official conduct that could
be reviewed under the APA. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 807-09.
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support to the majority's conclusion. There is no legislative his-
tory or other evidence of congressional concern about such
costs. And even if there were, the majority's reliance on that
cost is dubious. Fisher Brothers-type actions often involve miscon-
duct by low-level officials who are not authorized to consider
public policy. In contrast, direct challenges often involve miscon-
duct by high-level policymakers.2 °5 High-level misconduct may
be easier to discover through APA-type review and congressional
oversight than is low-level misconduct. If so, diversion costs may
be more justifiable in Fisher Brothers-type actions than in direct
challenges.'
(C) The Effect on Executive Branch Politymaking
With reference to the third category of social costs, the major-
ity said:
It is not difficult to predict the impact upon policymakers
that would result from the fear of virtually unlimited liability
and the prospect of virtually interminable litigation associated
with the plaintiffs' theory of liability. The "safest" course from
the decisionmaker's personal perspective will be to wait for
more conclusive data. But that course can carry a very high
social cost. This is graphically illustrated by asking what will
happen the next time a Commissioner of the FDA has to
make decisions like those here involved if the current Com-
missioner is exposed to this litigation and the United States
government is found liable for all the losses here alleged. We
believe that the discretionary function exception was intended
to make sure every Commissioner's judgment will not be
skewed by such considerations."'?
The court thus focused on the "personal perspective" of officials
who exercise discretionary functions.' It believed that those
officials want to avoid both personal involvement in time-con-
suming FTCA litigation and large money judgments in tort
201 See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 335-36 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing differences between levels of misconduct).
"6 Cf Krent, supra note 63, at 1545 (discretionary function exception justified to extent
that "policymaking is checked by the political and administrative processes, which diminish
the need for monitoring through tort actions").
11 Fzsher Bros., 46 F.3d at 287.
SSeid.
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against the government. The first motive justifies application of
the exception in a Fisher Brothers-type action; the second does
not.
(1) Avoidance of Personal Involvement in
FTCA Litigation
The majority's belief that officials who exercise discretionary
functions want to avoid personal involvement in FTCA litigation
is reasonable and reflects a reasonable understanding of the
purpose of the discretionary function exception. This belief
accords with one tenet of the immunity rules that protects offi-
cials from personal liability for claims based on constitutional
violations. In an early decision for the Second Circuit justifying
those rules, Judge Learned Hand "recognized that the very fact
of a lawsuit, not the ultimate liability determination, would itself
over-deter public officials from the satisfactory performance of
their official duties."' In addition, the Supreme Court relied
on the burdensome nature of litigation when it abandoned a
partly subjective standard for qualified immunity in favor of a
purely objective one. ° Thus, precedent on official immunity
supports the view of the Fisher Brothers majority that officials are
motivated to avoid personal embroilment in lawsuits.
The majority's view also accords with a central tenet of ad-
ministrative law. That tenet generally prohibits courts, in APA-
type review proceedings, from "prob[ing] the mental processes"
of high-level agency officials.' The prohibition on mental
probing, like the rules of official immunity, "allow officials to
perform their duties without fear of harassment from law-
William Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and Its
Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1105, 1159 (1996) (discuss-
ing Gregoire v. Bidde, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949)).
210 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (quoting Harow v. Fitff-
ad, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982), for proposition that qualified immunity rules are designed in
part "to protect public officials from the 'broad-ranging discovery that can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government'").
"' United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (quoting Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938)); see also, e.g., Florida v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); see
generally 1 DAVIs, supra note 104, § 8.6, at 396-401 (discussing courts' deference to special-
ized agencies' views); Daniel Gifford, The Morgan Cases: A Rerospective View, 30 ADMIN. LJ.
237, 276-87 (1978).
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suits."21 Thus, administrative law, like official-immunity law,
recognizes that officials want to avoid personal involvement in
litigation. That insight fully applies to litigation under the FTCA.
Finally, the majority's belief accords with the author's experi-
ence in government service.13 That experience indicates that
high-level government officials abhor involvement in FTCA litiga-
tion. There are three apparent reasons for their aversion. First,
officials regard tort actions as a personal affront, even if (as is
true of FTCA actions) those actions do not threaten them with
personal liability. Second, such actions require the officials to
deal with career government litigators, whose objective and tem-
perament differ from those of the official (often a political ap-
pointee). Third, and perhaps most important, officials believe
that they cannot derive any personal benefit from devoting their
time to defending an FTCA action. If the defense is successful,
it is merely a disaster averted; good news is, from the official's
point of view, no news at all. On the other hand, if the defense
is unsuccessful, the official may well suffer serious harm to his
career.
2 14
21? STEPHEN G. BREYER & RIcHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY. PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 868 (3d ed. 1992).
"' Ideally, of course, the validity of the majority's view should be judged by reference
to empirical data. Unfortunately, such data is lacking.
", See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1523. The report concludes that
[i]f damages for.., large-scale potential liabilities are in issue, the costs in
personal time, in career opportunities, and in public exposure for the individu-
al officer at the pivot of an enterprise liability exposure action well may ap-
proach or exceed the costs of involvement in litigation where only his own
personal fortune is on the line.
Id, See also Krent, supra note 63, at 1537 n.23 ("The very existence of many lawsuits may
hamper the effective workings of... an agency."). In the author's experience, high-level
officials find APA-type review and congressional review of their policy-based decisions less
objectionable than FTCA review. It appears that APA-type review is less objectionable for
two reasons. First, it is predictable. It generally occurs only after final agency action, see 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1994), and often involves parties and issues that appeared in the administra-
tive process. Second, APA-type review is perceived as less time-consuming than FTCA re-
view, because APA-type review focuses on the very same administrative record that was
compiled in the process of making the challenged decision. Cf Krent, supra note 63, at
1536 n.19 ("Even under the more deferential standard of the APA, judicial review arguably
has imposed a tremendous cost in terms of skewing the agency's allocation of resources.")
(citations omitted). It appears that congressional oversight is less objectionable than FTCA
review because, in the course of congressional oversight, an official can hope to accomplish
more than simply avoiding personal embarrassment. The official can create congressional
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If the majority was correct that high-level officials want to
avoid personal involvement in FTCA actions, the question arises
whether they may act on that desire. In theory, the answer is
yes. As we have defined the Fisher Brothers-type action, it posits
that an official can avert the plaintiff's injuries, and the resultant
lawsuit, by the manner in which he exercises discretion. In prac-
tice, the answer is also likely to be yes. The majority wondered
what would happen in future similar cases if it allowed the Fisher
Brothers action to go forward.215 One may imagine two possible
ways in which an FDA Commissioner would react. As the dissent
observed, the Commissioner might minimize reliance on objec-
tive data. For example, she could dispense with lab testing and
make a decision based only on anonymous phone calls.21 After
all, if the dissent's view had prevailed in Fisher Brothers, the lab
testing would have been the unprotected chink in the
Commissioner's armor. Alternatively, as the majority suggested,
the Commissioner could go to the other extreme by requiring
more data, from a variety of sources, before making a deci-
sion.27 By taking that route, the Commissioner would limit the
causal role of negligence from any one source of data, thereby
limiting the chance that negligence from any one source would
be found to have "proximately caused" later injuries. In either
event, the Commissioner would be acting differently from the
way she would act if she had based her decision solely on con-
siderations of public policy. It is quite reasonable to conclude
that Congress wanted to avoid this skewing of the exercise of
discretionary functions.
One possible objection to the majority's reasoning is that an
official may be sued (or fear suit) under the FTCA however he
allies who, unlike judges, do not come and go from one case to the next and can reward
the official with larger appropriations for her agencies and other concrete benefits. See
Ronald Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1176 (1981)
("There is considerable evidence that high-level officials are concerned about the budget
for their bureaus and consistently attempt to secure larger budgets.") (footnote omitted).
.. See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (discussing impact of allowing action to go forward), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49
(1995).
"' See i&. at 292 (Roth, J., dissenting) (explaining that Commissioner might avoid test-
ing altogether if liability is imposed in present case).
27 See id. at 287 (stating that Commissioner might decide to wait for more conclusive
data if liability is imposed in present case).
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decides to exercise a discretionary function. If, for example, the
FDA Commissioner decided not to ban the importation of a fruit
based on reports of its contamination, the Commissioner may
have been sued (or feared suit) by someone claiming to have
been poisoned after eating allegedly contaminated fruit. That
objection would have force if the likelihood and consequences
of an FTCA action were about the same regardless how the
Commissioner had exercised his discretion (or if the Commis-
sioner perceived them as such). In those circumstances, the
Commissioner's decision presumably would not be "skewed" by
the prospect of an FrCA action; the risks of litigation posed by
the courses of action available to the Commissioner would can-
cel each other out.
There are good reasons to believe, however, that the pros-
pects of an FrCA action will differ depending on what decision
an official makes in any particular case and that the official will
perceive the difference. The decision is more likely to lead to
an FTCA action if it has a clear and adverse economic impact
on an identifiable group of people. It will not be immune from
suit just because it also benefits many people, especially if the
benefit is hard to identify and insignificant in each instance.1 8
Commentators have noted that, because of these factors, tort
actions tend to have asymmetric effects on official conduct.
29
Fisher Brothers illustrates the point: the benefit to the public of
avoiding some possibly poisoned grapes is a diffuse, almost hypo-
thetical good, while the harm of a grape ban is a concrete eco-
nomic injury visited upon a specific group of people.
(2) Avoidance of Large Money Judgments
Against the Government
The majority erred in relying on its belief that officials who
exercise discretionary functions want to avoid large tort judg-
ments against the government. Although that belief may well be
218 See ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1522 (discussing how impact of government ac-
tion on specific group affects decision of whether to challenge that action in court).
29 See id.; Cass & Gillette, supra note 197, at 284 & n.89, 290 & nn.99-100.
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correct, an official's desire to avoid governmental liability should
not guide the interpretation of the discretionary function excep-
tion for two reasons.
First, such an approach does not accord with Supreme Court
precedent. This was shown in the discussion above of Berkovitz's
implications for the "based upon" issue.' Ber*ovitz held that
the government could be held liable for negligent lab testing by
FDA officials despite the obvious possibility that such liability
could influence the way the government regulated vaccine pro-
duction. The influence would have arisen because of the desire
of government officials to avoid government liability. Berkovitz
thus makes clear that such a desire does not guide the interpre-
tation of the exception.
Second, if courts gave effect to that desire by executive
branch officials, they would be disregarding Congress's judgment
in enacting the FTCA. It is fair to assume that every executive
official wants to avoid government tort liability for every injury
attributable to a government employee. The very existence of
the FTCA signifies that Congress did not want courts invariably
to honor that desire.
3. A Common Sense Evaluation of the Majority's Conclusion
Considering only the bottom line, the majority's conclusion
makes better sense than the dissent, for two reasons. First, the
majority opinion accords with common understanding of the
phrase "based upon." Most lay people would agree, in the
author's opinion, that the plaintiffs' claim was as much based
upon the Commissioner's decision as it was based upon any
antecedent laboratory negligence. After all, the Commissioner
did not have to respond the way he did to the positive lab re-
sults. He could have decided not to withdraw Chilean grapes
from the market, despite the positive results, perhaps in the
belief that the results might be erroneous or that contamination
was not widespread or seriously health-threatening." By the
e0 &e supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Berkovifr).
2 According to the complaint in Fisher Brothers, a grape cannot hold very much cyanide
to begin with, and the cyanide breaks down into harmless constituents soon after it has
been injected into the grape. See Baimaceda Pet. App., supra note 118, at 33a n.2 (panel
opinion).
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same token, he could have done exactly what he did, even if the
tests had turned out negative. The testing program was necessar-
ily looking for a needle in a haystack; lack of positive results
could not utterly impeach the anonymous reports of contamina-
tion. Because the damages seem more closely connected to the
Commissioner's decision than to the laboratory testing, it is hard
to say that the claim to recover those damages was based upon
the negligent testing but was not (at least also) based upon the
Commissioner's decision.
Second, as discussed above, the dissent's approach would
make it easy for plaintiffs to avoid the discretionary function
exception by artful pleading. For example, the Fisher Brothers
plaintiffs did not dispute that the Commissioner's decision to
withdraw Chilean grapes from the domestic market constituted
the exercise of a discretionary function. Yet they tried to sepa-
rate that decision from his consideration of the testing data.
The distinction is artificial. It ought not make the difference
between large-scale liability and total immunity.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR RESOLVING THE
"BASED UPON" ISSUE
Part III determined that the Fisher Brothers court erred by
using an "immediate cause" standard to resolve the "based up-
on" issue. This Part first describes an alternative approach to
resolving the issue, which was adumbrated in Part III's evalua-
tion of Fisher Brothers. The proposed approach is then applied to
cases that have presented the "based upon" issue and been the
subject of decisions by federal courts of appeals.
A. Description of the Proposed "Influence" Standard
As discussed, the Fisher Brothers court reasonably concluded
that the discretionary function exception bars a court in an
FTCA action, when determining proximate cause, from scrutiniz-
ing the decisionmaking process underlying protected con-
duct.' The court erred, however, in using an "immediate
cause" standard for identifying those cases in which such
See supra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny is necessary. An FrCA action will require the
"nonjudgmental" scrutiny that the Fisher Brothers court wanted to
avoid whenever the plaintiff must, in order to establish proxi-
mate cause, prove that the allegedly wrongful unprotected con-
duct influenced the manner in which a discretionary function
was exercised. It is therefore proposed that an "influence" stan-
dard be used to resolve the "based upon" issue.
1. Overview of the Influence Standard
Here, briefly, is when and how the influence standard would
operate. As discussed above, in many cases an FTCA plaintiff's
injuries stem from a course of government conduct. When the
government invokes the discretionary function exception in
those cases, the court must decide what conduct the plaintiff's
claim is based upon before it decides whether that conduct
constitutes the exercise of a "discretionary function." Resolution
of the "based upon" issue is easy when the plaintiff claims that
her injuries were proximately caused by conduct that itself con-
stitutes the exercise of a discretionary function. In that situation,
the claim is based upon the conduct identified as the proximate
cause and is therefore barred by the exception. That conclusion
follows from a recognition: (1) that, to resolve the claim, a
court would have to assess the wisdom of the manner in which
a discretionary function was exercised; and (2) that the excep-
tion was intended to prevent such "judgmental" judicial scrutiny.
Resolution of the "based upon" issue is harder, and the influ-
ence standard proposed here comes into play, when the plaintiff
claims that his injuries were proximately caused by government
conduct that does not constitute the exercise of a discretionary
function (unprotected conduct). If, in order to prove that claim,
the plaintiff must show that the unprotected conduct influenced
the manner in which a discretionary function was exercised, the
claim is based upon the exercise of a discretionary function. In
s When the plaintiff must show that allegedly wrongful and unprotected government
conduct influenced the exercise of a discretionary function, the exercise of a discretionary
function is part of the "gravamen of the complaint." The proposed approach is thus
consistent with the Court's understanding in Nelson of the "natural meaning" of the term
"based upon." See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993); supra note 112
(discussing Nelson).
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contrast, if the plaintiff need not show any such influence in
order to recover, the claim is not based upon the exercise of a
discretionary function. 4
2. Specific Features of the Influence Standard
a. Timing of "Protected Conduct"
The results of applying the influence standard vary, depend-
ing on when the protected conduct occurred in relation to the
unprotected conduct in the chain of events leading to injury.
The influence standard focuses on whether the plaintiff must
prove that the allegedly wrongful conduct affected protected
conduct. Because of that focus, the influence standard does not
bar cases in which the protected conduct occurs before the un-
protected conduct. On the other hand, the influence standard
bars some, but not all, cases in which the protected conduct
occurs after, or at the same time as, the unprotected conduct
The influence standard recognizes that, when the protected
conduct occurs before the allegedly wrongful, unprotected con-
duct, a court need not examine the way in which the unprotect-
ed conduct affected the protected conduct. For example, sup-
pose that prior to the Chilean Grape Scare, the FDA
Commissioner's boss, the Secretary of Health and Human Servic-
es (HHS), adopted a regulation requiring the Commissioner,
without exception, to withdraw from the domestic market any
imported fruit that was found by an FDA laboratory to be con-
taminated. That regulation would have left the Commissioner in
Fisher Brothers with no discretion upon receipt of the lab results
from Philadelphia; he would have been required to take the
actions that he took. In this hypothetical situation, the Secretary
of HHS would have exercised a discretionary function before the
allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct (the laboratory negli-
gence) occurred. In a lawsuit based on the laboratory negli-
The "influence" standard, described in terms of "probabilistic causation," see supra
note 7, provides as follows: The exception applies when, in order to establish proximate
cause, the plaintiff must show that the allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct increased
the probability that discretion would be exercised in the manner that it was, relative to the
probability that the discretion would have been exercised in the same manner had the
allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct not occurred.
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gence, the court would not have to scrutinize the process under-
lying the (HHS Secretary's) exercise of a discretionary function
to determine whether the laboratory negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of injury. The chain of events leading from the
allegedly wrongful conduct to the plaintiffs' injuries would not
have included the discretionary conductY
The influence standard for resolving the "based upon" issue
thus is consistent with Berkovitz's construction of the discretion-
ary function exception. As discussed above, Bet*ovitz implies that
the exception does not bar a claim that an official has negli-
gently implemented a program that is based on public policy
considerations if the official's conduct is not, itself, susceptible
to public policy considerations.' In such "negligent implemen-
tation" claims, the protected conduct precedes the allegedly
wrongful, unprotected conduct. The influence standard does not
bar such claims.
The influence standard bars some, but not all, claims in
which protected conduct occurs after, or at the same time as, the
allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct. A claim is barred only
if the plaintiff must prove that the unprotected conduct influ-
enced the subsequent (or contemporaneous) protected conduct.
Suppose, for example, that Secret Service agents violated federal
rules by allowing a television crew to film the execution of a
warrant to search a suspect's apartment.' Suppose, too, that
the evidence seized during the search caused an Assistant U.S.
Attorney to seek and obtain an indictment against the suspect.
The agents' actions clearly are unprotected, since they violate
agency prescriptions.' The prosecutor's decision, just as clear-
ly, is protected because it is a decision susceptible to public
policy analysis.' If the suspect sues the government only for
' The same conclusion would not necessarily follow if it were the FDA Commissioner,
rather than her boss, who decided in advance that fruit testing positive for contamination
would automatically be withdrawn from the market. Courts might well conclude that im-
plicit in that decision was a reservation by the Commissioner of discretion to change her
mind in a particular case. Cf Bagby & Gittings, supra note 4, at 237 (discussing whether
agency has implicit authority, in individual cases, to revise guidelines).
26 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
Cf Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994) (civil suit against Secret Service
agents who invited television crew to videotape search of residence).
' See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (holding that there is
no discretion when regulations explicitly prohibit course of action).
' See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. CL 1480, 1486 (1996) (finding that deci-
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damages from the media's invasion of his privacy, the suspect
will not need to prove that the agents' conduct influenced the
prosecutor's decision. The suspect's claim therefore would not
be based upon the prosecutor's decision.
b. Unimportance of Ability to Prove Influence
It may be easy for the plaintiff in a particular case to show
that allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct influenced subse-
quent protected conduct. That fact does not affect the applica-
tion of the influence standard.
Fisher Brothers illustrates the point. It may have been obvious
from the circumstances of the case that the allegedly negligent
laboratory results influenced the Commissioner's decision to
withdraw Chilean grapes from the domestic market. After all,
when the Commissioner ordered the lab tests, he apparently
intended to consider their results. Fisher Brothers may therefore
have been willing to try to prove proximate cause without testi-
mony by, or discovery from, the Commissioner. Even so, their
claim would be barred under the influence standard.
The influence standard is justified primarily by the risk that
the prospect of such suits will skew policymaking. To avoid that
risk, such suits have to be barred categorically, without regard to
a particular plaintiff's willingness to structure her suit in a way
that avoids the potential for that suit to skew policymaking.2 '
sion to prosecute does not lend itself to judicial review); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607 (1985) (same).
2" Cf United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682-83 (1987) (rejecting proposed test
under which Bivens remedy would be available for injury incident to military service if
maintenance of particular suit seeking recovery for that injury would not call into question
military discipline; "the mere process" of applying test to each case "would disrupt the
military regime"). For the reason discussed in the text, the proposed approach would also
bar a Fisher Brothers-type suit if the government attorneys defending the suit conceded that
the allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct influenced subsequent protected conduct
Such a concession would not affect the fact that the mere prospect of such suits could skew
policymaking by executive branch officials. A suit in that situation would be barred for the
additional reason that executive-branch officials cannot waive federal sovereign immunity;
only Congress can do so, by legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
215-16 (1983) (stating that only legislature, through legislation, can consent to suits against
government); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940) (stating that officer cannot
confer jurisdiction through his actions).
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c. Settings in Which the Influence Standard Applies
The influence standard applies in all of the factual settings in
which the "based upon" issue may arise: in cases involving the
regulation of public safety; the provision of public services; the
management of public lands; the regulation of businesses; and
criminal law enforcement.23" ' The Fisher Brothers court observed
that the protected conduct at issue there - the FDA
Commissioner's decision to withdraw Chilean grapes from the
domestic market - was a regulatory decision." 2 Regulatory de-
cisions typically are distinguished from, for example, governmen-
tal decisions about public works and public lands. 33 But the
Fisher Brothers court, properly, did not limit its holding to the
regulatory context.M The Supreme Court, in Berkovitz, rejected
the government's argument that the discretionary function ex-
ception immunizes all regulatory action, whether or not it in-
volves policymaking discretion.' By the same token, the Court
has emphasized that the exception protects policy judgments
"not of a regulatory nature. "2" Thus, the Court has made clear
that the exception protects discretionary policymaking whether
or not it takes place in a regulatory program. Likewise, the in-
fluence standard is applicable both in and outside of the regu-
latory context.
d. Nonexclusivity of the Influence Standard
The influence standard focuses on one situation - the Fisher
Brothers-type action - in which a court should conclude that a
claim is based upon the exercise of a discretionary function.
There are two other such situations, and possibly a third.
' See infra Part IV.B (describing cases in which "based upon" issue has arisen).
'2 See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
" See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 810 (1984) (discussing distinction between regulatory and non-regula-
tory functions).
2m See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 282 (broadly rejecting attempt to circumvent discretionary
function exception).
2 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 (1988) (rejecting government's
argument that discretionary function exception precludes liability for "all acts arising out of
regulatory programs of federal agencies").
'6 See VaigAirlines, 467 U.S. at 810.
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The first is obvious and has already been described. As the
courts have assumed, a claim is based upon protected conduct
when the plaintiff identifies that very conduct as the wrongful
conduct that proximately caused his injuries. Thus, the excep-
tion would have barred a claim by the growers in Fisher Brothers
that their injuries were proximately caused by the FDA
Commissioner's wrongful decision to withdraw Chilean grapes
from the domestic market Such a claim would require a court
to scrutinize the wisdom of an official's exercise of a discretion-
ary function. The claim would therefore be based upon the
protected conduct. In this situation, courts should give control-
ling weight to the plaintiff's proximate cause allegation.
Second, although the influence standard does not categorical-
ly bar claims in which the protected conduct precedes the alleged-
ly wrongful, unprotected conduct, proof of such claims in indi-
vidual cases is limited by the statutory term "based upon." The
limit comes into play when the plaintiff tries to use the manner
in which a discretionary function was exercised to show that
subsequent unprotected conduct was wrongful.
For example, suppose a plaintiff claims that she was injured
because of a laboratory scientist's negligent failure to perform a
required test on a lot of polio vaccine. Suppose, further, that
the scientist was trained by the government; that the training
was inadequate; and that the inadequacy of the training contrib-
uted to the scientist's failure to perform the required test. As-
sume (as the Supreme Court would likely hold) that the
government's decisions regarding the training of its scientists is
protected conduct, but that the duty to carry out the required
test is unprotected conduct.237 A claim based on the failure to
perform the test would not be categorically barred. That does
not mean, however, that the plaintiff could introduce evidence
of the government's inadequate training to show that the scien-
tist acted negligently. On the contrary, a court should refuse to
consider that evidence; if the court relied on that evidence to
find negligence, it would be second-guessing the government's
decisions regarding training. Thus, when a plaintiff uses evi-
dence of the way in which a discretionary function was exercised
"s See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text (discussing BeRkoitz).
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to show that later, unprotected conduct was negligent or other
wise "wrongful," the plaintiffs claim is based upon the protected
conduct."
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Gaubert suggests a third possible
situation in which a claim may be based upon the exercise of a
discretionary function.2 9 Justice Scalia argued that bank regula-
tors exercised a discretionary function in prescribing and enforc-
ing the conditions under which they would refrain from taking
over a bank." ° That was true, he maintained, even if the
regulators' enforcement of a particular condition - for exam-
ple, their selection of an outside consultant to advise the bank
- was negligent and entailed only "ordinary standards of busi-
ness judgment," and not "consider[ation] [of] matters of Gov-
ernment policy." 21 Justice Scalia reasoned that such actions
were part and parcel of the broader decision whether to take
over the bank, a decision that plainly involved protected discre-
tion.'24 This reasoning may be justified as reflecting an inter-
pretation of the term "based upon" - the claims ostensibly
based upon the negligent selection of a consultant were actually
based upon the decision whether to take over the bank. Or, the
reasoning may reflect an interpretation of the term "function":
m Proof that conduct was "wrongful" means proof that, if the conduct were that of a
private party, the private party would be liable under the tort law of the state where the
conduct occurred. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing Court's interpre-
tation of "wrongful" in discretionary function exception). Proof that conduct was wrongful
is thus distinct from proof that conduct violates the Court's two-step test for identifying the
exercise of discretionary conduct. The former is necessary to establish substantive liability
in tort; the latter is necessary to prove that the government has waived sovereign immunity
from tort liability. Although a plaintiff may not use evidence of the prior exercise of a
discretionary function to show that later conduct was wrongful, that evidence may be used
to show that the later conduct failed the two-step test. For example, recall the hypothetical
in which the Secretary of HHS exercises a discretionary function by promulgating a regula-
tion requiring the FDA Commissioner to withdraw food from the market if an FDA labora-
tory finds it to be contaminated. See supra text accompanying note 225. A plaintiff may rely
on that regulation to show that the Commissioner's failure, after such a laboratory finding,
to withdraw food from the market constitutes unprotected conduct.
See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 334-39 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(describing his analysis of why bank regulators' conduct was protected by discretionary
function exception).
240 See id. at 338-39 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text
(discussing Gaubert).
I" See Gaubert; 499 U.S. at 337 (Scalia,J., concurring).
242 See id., at 338-39 (Scalla, J., concurring).
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The selection of a consultant was one of the acts that made up
the bank regulators' exercise of a discretionary function -
namely, determining under what conditions to take over the
bank.
243
B. Application of the Influence Standard
Although Fisher Brothers has been the only decision by a feder-
al court of appeals to address the "based upon" issue, the issue
has arisen in other cases decided by federal courts of appeals.
An application of the influence standard to the facts of those
cases yields principles for resolving four recurring types of chal-
lenges by FTCA plaintiffs: (1) challenges based on the data
underlying the exercise of a discretionary function; (2) challeng-
es based on a procedural violation accompanying the exercise of
a discretionary function; (3) challenges to the implementation of
a decision based on protected discretion; and (4) challenges to
various aspects of the criminal law enforcement process.
.. As discussed supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text, it appears that, in the discre-
tionary function exception, Congress used the term "function" in contradistinction to "act."
In that prior discussion, it was suggested that the distinction signifies that not all discretion-
ary acts are protected by the exception. The distinction may, in the alternative, signify that
some non-discretionary acts are protected by the exception. The latter interpretation would
hold true if Congress used function to mean the set of acts carried out to achieve an offi-
cial objective. Cf. Rogers, supra note 4, at 798, 805. If so, unprotected acts could be part of
a broader, protected "function." There is a problem, however, with interpreting the term
"function" too broadly. An overly broad interpretation would lead the discretionary func-
tion exception to shield from liability many official actions that violate statutory or regula-
tory prescriptions or that, though discretionary, are not susceptible to public policy consid-
erations. An expansive definition of "function" also would conflict with Berkovit The gov-
ernment argued in Berkovitz that all of the allegedly wrongful conduct, including the misap-
plication of objective testing criteria, was included within the FDA's discretionary function
of regulating the drug industry. See Brief for Respondents, at 13-14, 24-25, Berkovitz v. Unit-
ed States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (No. 87-498) (focusing on whether agency function, rather
than act or duty, is discretionary). The Court's decision in Bedovitz implicitly rejected that
argument and the broad interpretation of the term 'function" on which the argument was
premised. See Bentotdtz, 486 U.S. at 534 (deciding that only certain actions were discretion-
ary).
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1. FTCA Claims Ostensibly Based Upon the
Data Underlying the Exercise of a
Discretionary Function
Fisher Brothers, of course, involved a claim ostensibly based
upon the negligent collection of data used in the subsequent
exercise of a discretionary function. The reasoning of Fisher
Brothers leads to the conclusion that, in general, such claims are
barred by the discretionary function exception.'" That is also
the usual (but not invariable) result under the influence stan-
dard, as shown by its application to the facts of four other cases
involving negligent data collection.
a. Johnson v. United States Department of Interior 45
In Johnson, the plaintiff claimed that a park ranger was care-
less both when he took a report from a hiker about a hiking
accident and when he conveyed that report to the rangers re-
sponsible for deciding whether and when to rescue the hiker's
companions.2" One of the hiker's companions died before the
rescue mission found him, and his estate brought an FTCA
action based on the rangers' conduct. The Tenth Circuit initially
determined that the rangers' decision to undertake a rescue
mission was protected conduct. 47 Thus, the estate could not
recover for undue delay in deciding to undertake the mis-
sion.2 ' The court then determined that the protection afford-
ed to the rescue decision also extended to the antecedent con-
duct of gathering and conveying information about the accident:
The gathering of information from an individual reporting a
potential problem and the communication between rangers is
inextricably tied to the rescue decision. The ultimate decision
is necessarily based upon this information. With respect to
4 See supra notes 176-221 and accompanying text (discussing majority holding in Fisher
Brothers).
4 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991).
' See id. at 334-35.
117 See id. at 338-39.
2 See id. at 335, 338-39.
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each reported incident, Park rangers are in the unique posi-
tion to assess the quality and quantity of information offered.
No meaningful way exists for this court to consider the na-
ture of these acts apart from the total rescue decision."
The holding in Johnson was correct. Applying the influence
standard, the discretionary function exception barred not only
the claim directly challenging the rescue decision but also the
claims ostensibly based upon the antecedent, allegedly improper
information gathering and reporting. That is true even if the
information gathering and reporting were unprotected conduct
because, for example, they were not susceptible to public policy
considerations. The claims regarding that presumably unprotect-
ed conduct were barred because, to establish that that conduct
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff
had to show that this unprotected conduct influenced protected
conduct. Specifically, the hiker's estate in Johnson had to prove
that the carelessness of one ranger in taking and conveying the
report of the hiking accident influenced the subsequent decision
by other rangers to undertake a rescue (in particular, its tim-
ing). The claims of negligent information gathering and report-
ing were therefore based upon protected conduct and barred by
the discretionary function exception.
b. Patterson v. United States'
In Patterson, the plaintiffs claimed that a mine inspector from
the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) negligently reported
the conditions at a mine, and that his negligence caused OSM
to decide not to use emergency funds to improve those condi-
tions. 5 ' The plaintiffs purported to challenge only the
inspector's conduct, and not OSM's subsequent discretionary
decision not to spend emergency funds. 2 A Fourth Circuit
panel held that the discretionary function exception did not bar
the action, because the inspector violated mandatory inspection
'4' Id. at 339-40.
'0 856 F.2d 670 (1988), vacated, 866 F.2d 1538, rev'd on reh'gen bane, 881 F.2d 127 (4th
Cir. 1989) (affirming district court decision).
15 See id. at 671.
21 See id. at 673.
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guidelines.253 The Fourth Circuit sitting en banc, however, va-
cated the panel's decision and held that the exception did bar
the action, because OSM's decision not to spend emergency
funds involved protected discretion.' The en banc court did
not explain why it chose to treat the claim as being based upon
the protected conduct of OSM rather than the unprotected
conduct of the inspector.
The en banc court's choice can be justified by applying the
influence standard. In order to demonstrate proximate cause,
plaintiffs in Patterson had to show that the allegedly wrongful,
unprotected conduct influenced protected conduct - that the
failure of mine inspectors to accurately report on mine condi-
tions influenced OSM's decision not to spend emergency funds.
The plaintiffs' claim was therefore based upon OSM's decision
(protected conduct) and barred by the exception.
c. In re Glacier Bay 5
Glacier Bay concerned "the methods and procedures the gov-
ernment uses to prepare, as a public service, nautical charts of
United States waters."2 The case arose when a ship using one
of those nautical charts ran aground on a rock in Cook Inlet,
Alaska. The rock was not noted on the chart. Companies with a
security interest in the ship sued under the FTCA. They claimed
that, in omitting the rock, government hydrographers had violat-
ed mandatory government surveying guidelines. The government
argued that the claim was barred by the discretionary function
exception, even if the hydrographers' conduct was unprotected,
because the subsequent decision by higher-level officials to ap-
prove public release of the chart was protected. 7 The district
court accepted that argument and dismissed the action.' The
Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded in relevant part, thereby
5See id. at 673-74.
Patterson v. United States, 881 F.2d 127, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1989).
'5 71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).While in the Justice Department, the author worked
on Glacier Bay.
26Id. at 1450.
'' See i& at 1449-51.
See id. at 1450-51.
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allowing the claim to proceed."6 9 The Ninth Circuit's decision
is correct under the influence standard.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court had
disregarded Berkovitz and other decisions by relying on the dis-
cretionary nature of the ultimate decision to approve public
release of the chart.2" "The proper question to ask," the court
of appeals explained, "is not whether the Government as a
whole had discretion at any point, but whether its allegedly
negligent agents did in each instance."" The court deter-
mined that "[e]ven if [government] reviewers had discretion to
approve the final charts, such discretion would not shield alleg-
edly negligent non-discretionary acts by the hydrographers.""62
The court recognized the possibility that, "because [government]
supervisors ultimately approved the surveys in question, [the
plaintiffs] may not be able to show any alleged hydrographer
errors actually caused them injury."' That possibility, in the
court's view, implicated the issue of proximate cause, an issue of
tort liability that was "irrelevant to discretionary function inqui-
ry."M264
On the surface, the fact pattern of Glacier Bay parallels that of
Fisher Brothers. In both cases, the plaintiff purported to challenge
unprotected data gathering; that unprotected conduct was fol-
lowed by protected conduct. In both cases, moreover, the protect-
ed conduct was, at least, a "but for" cause of the alleged injuries.
The security holders in Glacier Bay would have had no claim
against the government if the chart had not been approved for
public release. The plaintiffs in Fisher Brothers would not have
suffered significant economic harm if the FDA Commissioner
had decided not to withdraw Chilean grapes from the market.
Accordingly, in both cases the "sequential" condition for apply-
ing the influence standard was satisfied: the protected conduct
occurred after the unprotected conduct in the chain of events
leading to the alleged injuries."
29 See id. at 1451-54.
"0 See id. at 1451.
2" Id. at 1455 ("We reemphasize that analysis of the discretionary function exception




' See supra Part IVA2.a (explaining that results of applying influence standard vary,
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Closer consideration under the influence standard, however,
reveals a distinction that justifies the different results of Glacier
Bay and Fisher Brothers. To establish proximate cause, the plain-
tiffs in Fisher Brothers had to show that the Philadelphia lab re-
sults influenced the FDA Commissioner's decision to ban
grapes. '  In contrast, the plaintiffs in Glacier Bay did not have
to show that the omission of the fatal rock influenced the deci-
sion to approve the public release of the chart.2 67 Put another
way, they did not have to show that the official who approved
the chart relied on the "truth of the matter" asserted by the
allegedly negligent omission. By comparison, the growers in
Fisher Brothers did have to show that the FDA Commissioner
relied at least to some extent on the truth of the matter assert-
ed by the allegedly negligent Philadelphia lab results.2' Be-
cause the plaintiffs in Glacier Bay did not have to show that the
unprotected conduct influenced the protected conduct, their
claim regarding the unprotected conduct was not based upon
the protected conduct under the influence standard.' The
Ninth Circuit therefore correctly reversed the dismissal of the
action.20
depending on whether protected conduct precedes, follows, or occurs at same time as,
allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct).
' See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 285-86 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
2 See Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d at 1454-55.
To put the same point in terms of "probabilistic causation," see supra note 224, the
plaintiffs in Cdacier Bay did not have to show that the omission of the rock increased the
probability that the chart would be approved, compared to the probability that it would
have been approved had the rock's presence been noted.
- See Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d at 1453.
270 The Ninth Circuit was also correct in observing in Glacier Bay that the government
might still rely on the discretionary nature of the chart review process to defeat recovery.
See id. at 1451. The government could attempt to show that, because of the relevant
officials' broad discretion to approve or disapprove the release of a chart, it was entirely
speculative whether the defective chart would be approved. Such a showing might, for
example, have entailed evidence of low approval rates. The evidence might so attenuate
the causal link between the hydrographer's oversight and the ship's grounding that a court
could decide, as a matter of state law, that proximate causation was not proven. In addi-
tion, the government might altogether sever the causal link between the unprotected con-
duct and the injuries through evidence that the chart approval process itself was so faulty
that it constituted a superseding cause under state law. Cf Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1813, 1819 (1996) (interpreting admiralty law to incorporate "superseding cause"
doctrine). An FTCA claim directly challenging the chart-approval decision would be barred
by the discretionary function exception, as the Glacier Bay court held. See Glacier Bay, 71
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d. Appley Brothers v. United States27'
In Appley Brothers, a federally licensed grain warehouse was
operating with inventory shortages.' Department of Agricul-
ture inspectors noted those shortages during an inspection,
directed their elimination, and later conducted a special inspec-
tion to check compliance with the ordered elimination of the
shortages. 3 Although the shortages continued, they were neg-
ligently not noted by the inspectors during the special inspec-
tion."4 As a result, plaintiff farmers and others continued to
deposit grain with the warehouseY5  Ultimately, the
warehouse's federal license to operate was revoked. The plain-
tiffs claimed in their FTCA action that the Department of Agri-
culture would have revoked the license sooner, causing plaintiffs
to lose less money, but for the failure of federal warehouse
inspectors during the special inspection to follow mandatory
inspection procedures. 6  The government argued that the
claim was barred because of the discretionary nature of the
decision whether to revoke a warehouse license.'
The Eighth Circuit held that the claim was not barred by the
discretionary function exception.' The court agreed with the
government that the decision whether to revoke the license was
protected conduct.' On the other hand, the court agreed
with the plaintiffs that the inspectors' conduct was not protect-
ed, because it "violated . . . the mandatory requirements of the
grain inspector's handbook."' s The court considered it disposi-
tive that "[t]he causative fact in [the plaintiffs'] claims is the
inspectors' failure to follow the mandatory requirements of the
handbook, not the Secretary's failure to revoke [the
F.3d at 1454 (recognizing that chart approval requires discretionary judgment).
'7 7 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1993).
' S id. at 721.
23 See i. at 721-22.
274 Wid.
275 See id.
276 See id. at 722-23.
77 See id. at 723.
27' See id. at 725-27.
m See id. at 725, 727.
"0 See id. at 725.
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warehouse's] license."' The inspectors' failure to determine
whether inventory shortages continued to exist, the court held,
"prevented the Secretary from exercising discretion to decide
whether to revoke [the warehouse's] license.""
The Eighth Circuit believed that the case before it posed "a
very close question,""83 and the question remains close when
the case is analyzed by applying the influence standard. The
influence standard plainly bars a claim when the plaintiff must
show that the unprotected conduct affected the way in which an
official exercised a discretionary function.'s It is less clear
whether the standard also should bar a claim when the plaintiff
must show that unprotected conduct caused an official to fail to
exercise a discretionary function. Resolution of the latter claim
would not require a court to examine the basis for a policy-
based, substantive decision - such as a decision not to revoke a
warehouse license - since no such decision was made.
The same difficulty arises in many FTCA cases that do not
present the "based upon" issue. In those cases, plaintiffs claim
that they were injured because of the failure of a government
official to exercise protected discretion.' Such claims do not
require the courts to assess the wisdom of any policy-based,
substantive decision.' Nonetheless, most courts, including the
Eighth Circuit, have held that such claims fall within the discre-
tionary function exception. 7 Those courts rely on the lan-
guage of the exception which bars not only claims based upon
the exercise of a discretionary function but also claims based
upon the "failure to exercise" a discretionary function.'
2' Id at 726.
22 Id. at 725-26.
21 Id. at 725.
I See id. at 725-27. It is clear, for example, that the plaintiff in Fisher Brothers would
have had to show that the positive test results from Philadelphia influenced the
Commissioner's decision to withdraw Chilean grapes from the market, and that the plain-
tiffs in Johnson would have had to show that the negligent reporting by a park ranger influ-
enced the decision concerning whether and when to undertake a rescue.
2 See, e.g., In re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 982, 996 (9th
Cir. 1987) (finding that plaintiff's claims were based on government's failure to warn of
radiation exposure danger).
2 See iU at 998 (holding that government's lack of policy to warn road workers of
presence of dioxin qualified as discretionary function).
27 See Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1987); Fishback & Killefer,
supra note 4, at 299 & n.51 (citing cases relying upon discretionary function exception).
' See, e.g., Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 996-99 (indicating that statute exempts
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The reasoning of these courts supports the conclusion that,
applying the influence standard, the claim in Appley Brothers was
based upon the failure to suspend or revoke the grain ware-
house license. Plaintiffs in Appley Brothers alleged that their inju-
ries were proximately caused by the inspectors' failure to note
the continuing grain shortages.29 To support that allegation,
plaintiffs had to prove that the inspectors' failure influenced
higher-level officials not to suspend or revoke the license.' To
assess that proof, the court would have had to scrutinize the
reason for the latter officials' failure to act."' The discretion-
ary function exception bars such scrutiny.?
2. FTCA Claims Ostensibly Based Upon Procedural
Violations Accompanying the Exercise of a
Discretionary Function
In two cases decided by federal courts of appeals, FTCA plain-
tiffs alleged that their injuries were proximately caused by the
any claim based on failure to exercise or perform discretionary function).
I See Appley Bros. v. United States, 7 F.3d 720, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1993).
29 See id. at 725-26.
291 See id. at 723-27 (discussing effect of failure to check warehouse's compliance with
noted violations on application of discretionary function exception).
The correctness of the majority view on the "failure to exercise discretion" issue is
beyond the scope of this Article. In addressing that issue, however, courts should recognize
that two kinds of discretion may be involved. An official may have both 'substantive" discre-
tion - discretion to make a substantive decision, such as whether to revoke a warehouse
license - and "circumstantial" discretion - discretion to decide under what circumstances
he will exercise substantive discretion. If the official has circumstantial discretion, an action
directly challenging his failure to exercise substantive discretion would require judgmental
judicial scrutiny of the way in which the official exercised circumstantial discretion. See
Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 996-99 (discussing government's failure to warn test
participants of health problems resulting from radiation exposure). In other words, the
court must decide whether it was wise for the official not to act. See id. at 997 (discussing
magnitude of risk to which test participants were exposed and potential risk of creating
public anxiety if government gave warnings). Similarly, when the plaintiff in a Fisher Broth-
emrtype action claims that unprotected conduct led to a subsequent failure to exercise sub-
stantive discretion, the court must, to resolve the claim, apply nonjudgmental judicial scru-
tiny to the manner in which circumstantial discretion was exercised. See Fisher Bros. Sales,
Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 285-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (analyzing exercise of
circumstantial discretion), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995). In other words, the court must
decide whether the allegedly wrongful, unprotected conduct increased the probability that
a discretionary function would not be exercised, relative to the probability that it would
have been exercised had the wrongful conduct not occurred. See id. at 286.
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government's violation of a procedural requirement associated
with the exercise of a discretionary function. The courts of ap-
peals in these cases reached conflicting results. The proper reso-
lution of this conflict can be determined by applying the influ-
ence standard.
a. Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States25
In Jayvee Brand, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) issued a regulation banning the use of a flame retardant
called "Tris" on children's clothing.' Manufacturers of
children's sleepwear sued the CPSC under the FTCA, claiming
that, in imposing the ban, the CPSC had failed to follow the
statutorily required procedures. 5 Although the D.C. Circuit
provided scant reasoning for its holding,' it upheld the dis-
missal of the suit.' The influence standard, however, provides
a principled basis for the holding.
In the lead opinion, Judge Bork concluded that "making a
discretionary decision without following mandated procedures
should be characterized, for the purposes of the FTCA, as an
abuse of discretion. " ' The discretionary function exception
applies, by its terms, "whether or not the discretion involved be
abused."' Thus, Judge Bork would have brought the CPSC's
procedural violation within the terms of the statute by treating it
as a component of the agency's substantive decision to ban Tris.
In support of that result, Judge Bork cited: (1) his finding "ab-
solutely no evidence that in enacting the FTCA Congress intend-
ed to police internal governmental law-making procedure with
721 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See id. at 387. The CPSC determined that Tris was a carcinogen. See id.
" See id.
" See generally RONALD A. CASS Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 1006
(2d ed. 1994) (discussing Jayvee Brand).
297 See Jayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 395 (affirming dismissal by district court). Judge Bork
wrote the lead opinion, one section of which concluded that the suit was properly dis-
missed under the discretionary function exception. See id. at 389-90. Senior Circuit Judge
Lumbard concurred in the dismissal of the suit based on a different section of Judge
Bork's opinion, which did not discuss the discretionary function exception. See id. at 395
(Lumbard, J., concurring).
Jayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 390.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
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damage actions"; and (2) his view that the "thrust" of the FTCA
evinced the contrary intention.' Senior Circuit Judge
Lumbard concurred solely on the basis of those two impression-
istic remarks about the FTCA in general; he did not believe,
however, that the result could be specifically justified under the
discretionary function exception "without straining unduly on
common sense or past precedent."s'° The remaining member
of the panel, Judge Edwards, wrote separately to state that he
concurred "only in the result.""°
Applying the influence standard, the court would have first
recognized that the plaintiffs purported to base their suit upon
the CPSC's violation of procedural requirements. That procedur-
al violation, of course, was unprotected conduct'03 The govern-
ment argued, in effect, that the suit was actually based, not
upon the procedural violations, but upon the CPSC's substantive
decision to ban Tris, which the plaintiffs conceded was protected
conduct.' The "based upon" issue is resolved by determining
that, to establish proximate causation, plaintiffs would have had
to show that the unprotected conduct influenced the protected
conduct: more specifically, that the CPSC's procedural violations
influenced its substantive decision to ban Tris. Thus, the action
was based upon the substantive decision, and, because that deci-
sion was protected conduct, the action was barred by the discre-
tionary function exception."
Application of the influence standard explains the relevance
of factors that were cited as significant, without explanation, in
the opinions in Jayvee Brand As discussed above, the influence
standard recognizes that the kind of judicial scrutiny that the
3' SeeJayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 391-92.
" Id. at 395 (Lumbard, J., concurring) ("I would rest our affirmance squarely on the
finding that Congress never intended to open the federal government to tort liability for
procedural infractions in the promulgation of administrative rules."); id. at 393 (Lumbard,
J., concurring) (concluding that "at bottom we arrive at our decision because we do not
know how to confine this new cause of action were we to accept the broad principle pro-
pounded by [plaintiffs]").
See id. at 395 (Edwards, J., concurring).
"0 See id. at 389 (stating that procedural violations involve non-discretionary decisions).
See id.
See id. at 389-90 (dismissing case because of discretionary function exception); cf
Bagby & Gittings, supra note 4, at 236-37 (criticizing result in Jayvee Brand and arguing that
Judge Bork's decision does not encourage agencies to act responsibly).
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Fisher Brothers majority wanted to avoid will not be required
when the protected conduct occurs before (rather than after or at
the same time as) the unprotected conduct.' Judge Bork's re-
mark, that in Jayvee Brand "[p]rocedure and substance [were]
intertwined,"' points up the contemporaneous occurrence of
the protected and the unprotected conduct in that case. Judge
Bork again alluded to the relevance of the sequence in which
the protected conduct and the unprotected conduct occurred
when he distinguished the case before the court from
Hatahley" - in which the Court held that the exception did
not bar an FrCA claim based on a procedural violation - on
the ground that in Hatahley the protected conduct occurred
before the unprotected conduct on which the claim was
based.' That distinction is appropriate for the same reasons,
discussed above, that the exception would not have applied if,
before the Chilean Grape Crisis arose, the Secretary of HHS had
promulgated a regulation requiring the FDA Commissioner to
ban any fruit that was found by an FDA laboratory to be con-
taminated. 10
Both Judge Bork and Senior Circuit Judge Lumbard also
mentioned the causal connection between the unprotected con-
duct and the protected conduct Judge Bork remarked that the
plaintiffs "might very well have been subjected to the same Tris
ban had statutory procedures been followed."" Judge
30 See supra Part IVA2.a.
"7 Jayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 389.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing Hatah/ey).
Se Jayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 389.
It is clear that the exception does not apply when a government employee
fails to follow obligatory procedures in applying a rule that itself is an exercise
of discretion. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173... (1965) .... This entails
liability for improper executive action occurring after and in the implementation of
a rule previously adopted. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that if appellants
challenged the substance of an agency-formulated ban on Tris-treated gar-
ments, the discretionary function exception would shield the United States
from liability.... We are presented here, however, with a third case: an attack,
not on the rule or its execution, but on the procedures by which the Tris ban
was formulated and adopted.
Id. (emphasis added).
", See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
"' Jayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 393.
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Lumbard similarly listed the lack of a causal connection between
the CPSC's procedural violation and its substantive decision
among the factors relevant to dismissal of the case."1 2 The
judges erred, however, in implying that it was the lack of such a
connection that justified dismissal of the suit. What matters is
that, in order to prove proximate cause, plaintiffs had to prove
the existence of such a causal connection - the procedural
violations influenced the substantive decision to ban Tris. It does
not matter whether they would have been successful in mount-
ing such proof or not. The mere fact that such proof was re-
quired barred the suit, because, in evaluating the proof, a court
would have had to examine the basis for an agency's exercise of
a discretionary function. For that reason, the suit was based
upon the substantive decision to ban Tris and, hence, barred by
the discretionary function exception.
b. Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service'"3
The D.C. Circuit considered its decision in Jayvee Brand "argu-
ably contrary" to the Second Circuit's decision in Myers &
Myers."14 Indeed, the results of the two decisions cannot be rec-
onciled. Application of the influence standard leads to the con-
clusion that Myers & Myers was decided incorrectly.
In Myers & Myers, the Postal Service refused to renew con-
tracts under which the plaintiffs hauled mail by truck between
post offices. s 5 The plaintiffs sued the government under the
See id. at 396 (Lumbard, J., concurring) (suggesting that most plaintiffs in such cases
would not be able to show causation).
Here, in view of the novel form of tortious conduct involved, the anomaly
of submitting this distinctively federal claim to the vagaries of state law, the
potentially limitless number of private suits based on agencies' procedural in-
fractions, coupled with the unlikelihood of most plaintiffs making the necessary showing
of causation to prevail, and Congress's providing an alternative remedy for pro-
cedural infractions by declaring the resulting rules unlawful, it is extremely
unlikely that Congress ever intended to submit the federal government to tort
liability for such infractions. On that basis alone, I would reject [the plaintiffs']
claim.
Id. (emphasis added).
"' 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
S" &eJayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 393.
&15 See Myers & Myers, 527 F.2d at 1253-54.
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FTCA for damages arising from the non-renewal.1 6 "The basis
of the [plaintiffs'] claim [was] that the Postal Service failed to
renew the [plaintiffs'] contracts solely because of the Service's
wrongful and negligent interpretation of information received by
the Service concerning the [plaintiffs'] truck rental arrange-
ments." 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the Service misinterpreted
the information because it evaluated the information without the
notice and hearing required by due process and Postal Service
regulations."s 8 The Second Circuit recognized that the Service's
decision not to renew the contracts constituted the exercise of a
discretionary function. 19 Nonetheless, the court summarily re-
jected the government's contention that a tort claim grounded
upon the procedural violation was barred by the discretionary
function exception.' ° The court reasoned that "a federal offi-
cial cannot have discretion to behave unconstitutionally or out-
side the scope of his delegated authority."'
In Jayvee Brand, the D.C. Circuit supposed that "Myers & Myers
may be distinguishable... because of the differences in the
nature of the processes in issue."' The Jayvee Brand court ex-
plained: "The decision to award a government contract - al-
though requiring discretion - seems to us more like a decision
requiring discretion in the execution of policy than does a legis-
lative determination, which itself requires policy judgments.""3
But the D.C. Circuit ultimately doubted that the distinction
between quasi-adjudicatory and quasi-legislative determinations
justified the conclusion that "[a]ny procedural irregularity" con-
nected with a quasi-adjudicatory determination - such as the
decision not to renew a government contract - should "give
rise to a cause of action for damages." 24 That doubt was well-
founded for the same reason, discussed above, that the influ-
3,6 See id. at 1254.
". Id. at 1255.
"' See id. at 1257-58.
" See id. at 1256-57.
See id. at 1261.
321 Id. at 1261 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
3 Jayvee Brand v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
323 d
2 See id. at 393-94.
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ence standard does not apply only to regulatory decisions.s
Thus, as the D.C. Circuit in Jayvee Brand all but admitted, its
decision conflicted with the Second Circuit's decision in Myers
& Myers.
Application of the influence standard to Myers & Myers closely
resembles its application to Jayvee Brand. In Myers & Myers, as in
Jayvee Brand, the plaintiff had to show that the unprotected
conduct influenced the protected conduct. In Myers & Myers,
that showing entailed proof that the Postal Service's failure to
give plaintiffs notice and a hearing contributed to its improper
interpretation of the information and its resulting decision not
to renew plaintiffs' contracts. Regardless of whether the plaintiffs
could have mounted such proof, the fact that they were re-
quired to do so makes their suit one based upon the non-renew-
al of their contracts - a decision protected by the discretionary
function exception.'ss In sum, analysis of Jayvee Brand and
Myers & Myers under the influence standard yields a rule appli-
cable in regulatory and other contexts in which an agency exer-
cises a discretionary function without following prescribed proce-
dures: The discretionary function exception bars a claim ostensi-
bly based upon a procedural violation accompanying the exer-
cise of a discretionary function. 27
m See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
The D.C. Circuit observed in Jayvee Brand that, "in Myers & Myers, had proper proce-
dures been followed, the plaintiffts] apparently would have received the contracts for
whose loss [they] sought damages." Jayvee Brand, 721 F.2d at 393. That observation implies
that determining whether a suit is barred by the discretionary function exception depends
on plaintiffs' ability to prove that the allegedly wrongful unprotected conduct affected the
protected conduct. That implication is erroneous for reasons already discussed. See supra
notes 311-12 and accompanying text (arguing judges erred in implying that lack of causal
connection justified dismissal). It is the necessity for plaintiffs to prove such a causal con-
nection, rather than their ability to do so, that triggers the application of the exception.
I" Myers & Myers shows that procedural violations may have a substantive dimension.
See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1975)
(explaining that plaintiff alleged Postal Service's substantive decision was flawed because it
failed to follow notice and hearing procedures). Indeed, some procedural requirements
may, on their face, reveal their substantive dimension. For example, suppose a statute or
regulation expressly required an agency, when making a certain decision, to consider spe-
cific public policy factors, such as the impact on the environment. The decision would be
protected by the exception, since it would entail consideration of public policy. Under the
influence standard, the exception would bar an FFCA action alleging that the agency failed
to consider the impact on the environment. That is because, in such an action, the plaintiff
would have to show that the procedural violation influenced the agency's substantive deci-
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3. FICA Claims Ostensibly Based Upon the Wrongful and
Unprotected Implementation of a Protected Policy
Decision: Autery v. United States'
Autery did not squarely present the "based upon" issue. The
case is discussed here nonetheless, because it illustrates one
aspect of applying the influence standard that, it is hoped, will
clarify analysis of the discretionary function exception as a
whole. Under the influence standard, Autery was incorrectly de-
cided.
In Autery, a rotted locust tree in the Great Smokey Mountain
National Park fell on a car, killing the driver and injuring his
passenger as they drove to the visitor's center in the park."2
The government successfully argued that an FrCA suit based on
the accident was barred by the discretionary function exception.
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the "development and
implementation" of the park's "tree inspection plan" were
"grounded in social, economic and public policy."' s It based
that determination on its supposition that
[t]o decide on a method of inspecting potentially hazardous
trees, and in carrying out the plan, the Park Service likely
had to determine and weigh the risk of harm from trees in
various locations, the need for other safety programs, the
extent to which the natural state of the forest should be
preserved, and the limited financial and human resources
available."3'
The court in Autery almost certainly erred in concluding that
the discretionary function exception protected the entire injuri-
ous course of government conduct, including the ground-level
implementation of the tree inspection policy. It is exceedingly
doubtful that the park rangers and maintenance personnel re-
sion. Cf Rogers, supra note 4, at 777, 788-789 (stating that an agency "abuses," rather than
.exceeds," its discretion when it bases decision on grounds other than those it is required
to consider). An agency's failure to consider a statutorily mandated factor would ordinarily,
however, be subject to review in an APA-type proceeding. See supra note 188 and accompa-
nying text.
"' 992 F.2d 1523 (1lth Cir. 1993). While in theJustice Department, the author worked
on Autery.
12 See id. at 1524.
" See id. at 1530.
"' Id. at 1531.
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sponsible for actually looking for rotted trees were authorized to
consider public policy while doing so. That doubt should not
have been resolved in favor of the government.332 To be sure,
the Court in Gaubert said that, when a government agent exercis-
es discretion under a policy, "it must be presumed that the
agent's acts are grounded in policy."33 But the Court also al-
lowed the plaintiff to allege and prove "facts which would sup-
port a finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of
conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the
regulatory regime. " 's The presumption surely was overcome in
Autery by evidence of the position and duties of the officials who
actually inspected for tree hazards. 5 As the court of appeals
described it, the policy was to "hav[e] park rangers and mainte-
nance personnel first inspect trees from the roadway, and then,
if in their judgment, the trees evidenced sufficient decay to
demand a closer inspection, to take appropriate action." 3s' The
visual inspection of trees for decay is not susceptible to public-
policy considerations.3 7 Consequently, negligent inspection was
not protected by the discretionary function exception.'
The court in Autery might have avoided its erroneous conclu-
sion to the contrary if it had followed the approach proposed
332 See supra note 63 (citing cases holding that government bears burden of proving
applicability of exception).
"3 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991).
34 See id. at 324-25.
See id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that, ordinarily, government em-
ployees working at operational level are not responsible for policy decisions).
Auteyy, 992 F.2d at 1529 (original emphasis omitted).
Compare Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D.C.P.R. 1951), which, like Autery,
involved an FTCA claim for damages caused when a rotted tree on federal land crushed a
car. The tree in Toledo was grown as part of a government experiment to determine what
types of tropical plants grew well in Puerto Rico. See id. at 840. The court in Toledo correctly
determined that, in these circumstances, a decision to allow an experimental tree to re-
main standing after it began to rot was susceptible to public policy considerations. See id. at
840-41.
r- See Autery, 992 F.2d at 1527-29. Public policy may have underlain antecedent con-
duct, such as deciding how much time rangers should devote to tree inspections. Thus, the
discretionary function exception would have barred the plaintiffs in Autery from arguing
that the rangers did not have enough time to do adequate inspections. See id. at 1531; supra
text accompanying note 331; cf Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1991)
(stating that Gaubert does not require court to presume that discretionary act of low-level
official involved protected discretion in absence of regulations signifying grant of authority
to exercise such discretion).
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here. To apply the influence standard, a court must initially
identify what conduct the plaintiff is purporting to base her
claim upon. The plaintiffs in Autery had two potential bases for
their tort claim: the development of the tree inspection policy
and its implementation. The Autety court failed to distinguish
between these two theories of recovery, as is clear from its state-
ment that the "development and implementation" of the policy
were "grounded in social, economic and public policy."' The
plaintiffs in Autery conceded that the development of the policy
was protected conduct.' That concession, however, did not
prevent them from asserting a claim based upon the implemen-
tation of the policy. Such a claim would not be regarded as
really being based upon the antecedent protected conduct un-
der the influence standard." Instead, the validity of the negli-
gent implementation claim would depend solely on whether the
implementation itself constituted a discretionary function. More
generally, the influence standard clarifies that not all conduct
implementing government policy is protected by the exception.
4. FrCA Claims Based Upon Criminal Law
Enforcement Activities
The government's enforcement of criminal laws, like its per-
formance of civil functions, typically entails both conduct that is
protected by the discretionary function exception and conduct
that is not so protected. It is therefore not surprising that the
"based upon" issue has arisen in FTCA cases involving criminal
law enforcement. A discussion of two such cases shows that the
courts have not resolved the "based upon" issue consistently in
this context, and that the influence standard would provide such
consistency.
" SeeAuy, 992 F.2d at 1530.
m0 See id. at 1527.
" See supra notes 98-100, 226 and accompanying text (discussing negligent implementa-
tion claims and how such claims would be analyzed under influence standard).
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a. Gray v. Bell 2
In Gray v. Bel4 the former Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), L. Patrick Gray, sued the former
Attorney General, Griffin Bell, as well as the United States.
Gray's suit concerned the Justice Department's decision to seek
an indictment against him for conspiring to violate the civil
rights of relatives and friends of suspected members of the
Weatherman Underground Organization." Gray alleged: (1)
that prosecutors presented false or incomplete evidence to the
grand jury and inadequately investigated Gray's complicity in
civil rights violations committed by low-level FBI agents; (2) that
this conduct was unconstitutional; and (3) that it caused the
grand jury to return an indictment against him and the Justice
Department to pursue a prosecution on the indictment.'"
The D.C. Circuit held that Gray's FTCA claims against the
government were barred by the discretionary function exception.
In so holding, the court analyzed separately the government's
decision to institute a prosecution and the antecedent investiga-
tion and presentation of the case to the grand jury. 5 The
court determined that the government's decision to institute a
prosecution "clearly falls," as a categorical matter, within the
exception.' By contrast, the court regarded pre-prosecution
activities to be "not so easily characterized" as a categorical mat-
ter. 7 The court ultimately found it unnecessary to decide the
proper characterization of pre-prosecution activities. It found
that, in the case before it, the pre-prosecution activities were
"too intertwined" with the decision to prosecute to be separated
meaningfully.' The court explained that "each allegation of
improper investigatory conduct is inextricably tied to the deci-
sion to prosecute and the presentation of evidence to the Grand
Jury.... Indeed, the gist of Gray's complaint focuses on alleged
causal links between the negligent investigation, the presentation
712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
3 See id. at 492-94.
'4 See id. at 493-95.
"4 See id. at 513-16.
"4 See id. at 515.
7 See id.
148 See id. at 516.
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of false and misleading evidence, and the ultimate prosecu-
tion." 9 The court emphasized, though, that "there can be cas-
es where conduct of the prosecutor prior to, or even after, the
initiation of Grand Jury proceedings is removed sufficiently from
the decision to prosecute that the discretionary function clause
would not provide any protection."' The court cited as exam-
ples "participation by prosecutors in illegal searches and seizures
during the course of an investigation, or the dissemination of
defamatory information to the media."" Those actions could
be disassociated from the subsequent decision to prosecute, the
court believed, "because the harm alleged in such cases is dis-
tinct from the harm caused by the ultimate prosecution it-
self." 2
The influence standard furnishes an analytic undergirding for
the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in Gray. Former FBI Director Gray
challenged government conduct - a criminal investigation and
the presentation of evidence to a grand jury - that would not
be protected by the exception if, as Gray asserted, it violated the
Constitution or other legally binding prescriptions."3 The D.C.
Circuit correctly concluded that it was not necessary to deter-
mine whether that conduct was indeed protected. Even if it
were unprotected, Gray's claims regarding that conduct were
based upon the ultimate decision to prosecute, and therefore
barred by the exception. That is so because, to establish that the
allegedly wrongful pre-prosecution activities proximately caused
his injuries, Gray had to prove that they influenced the decision
to prosecute him. Gray's own complaint acknowledged the need
for such proof; it focused on the "causal links between the negli-
gent investigation, the presentation of false and misleading evi-
dence, and the ultimate prosecution." 4 Consequently, the res-
olution of Gray's claim would have required judicial inquiry into
the basis for the decision to prosecute him. His claims, ostensi-
bly based upon unconstitutional pre-prosecution activities, were
349 Ii
' Id. at 515.
51 Id.
52 1d.
... See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (holding that discretion-
ary function exception only covers discretionary acts).
'5 Gray, 712 F.2d at 516.
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therefore based upon the decision to prosecute and, hence,
barred by the discretionary function exception.
The D.C. Circuit observed that the exception would not nec-
essarily bar claims based on a prosecutor's personal involvement
in a pre-prosecution illegal search or in defamation. 55 The
court reasoned that "the harm alleged in such cases is distinct
from the harm caused by the ultimate prosecution itself."'
That reasoning accords with the influence standard, if, as the
court appeared to assume, the plaintiff sought only damages
attributable to the search or to the defamation, and not damag-
es attributable to the subsequent prosecution. Such claims are
not based upon the decision to prosecute for the reason dis-
cussed above: To prevail on such claims, the plaintiff does not
need to show that the illegal search or the defamatory conduct
influenced the decision to prosecute. 57 The plaintiff may re-
cover for damages arising from the search or the defamation,
and such damages may arise from such conduct, whether or not
the conduct leads to a prosecution.'
b. Payton v. United Statess 9
In Payton, a parolee from federal custody, Whisenhant, mur-
dered three women, including the plaintiffs' decedent.'
Whisenhant's prison records, according to plaintiffs, repeatedly
diagnosed him as psychotic and described him as violent and
assaultive. ! The plaintiffs sued the government under the
FTCA, asserting multiple theories of liability: (1) the United
States Parole Board was negligent in releasing Whisenhant, given
the evidence of his violence and psychosis; (2) the Parole Board
15 See id. at 515 (stating that there can be cases where prosecutor's conduct prior to
initiation of proceedings is not protected by discretionary clause).
% Id.
" See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (explaining that harm caused by inva-
sion of privacy during illegal search is distinct from harm caused by later prosecution).
" See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that discre-
tionary function exception did not bar claim based on prosecutor's disclosure of grand jury
testimony to unauthorized third parties because that conduct was not "inextricably tied" to
discretionary decisions regarding prosecution).
679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
o See id. at 477-78.
'1 See id. at 478.
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negligently failed to require post-release treatment or supervision
of Whisenhant; (3) the Parole Board negligently failed to ac-
quire, read, or consider records that revealed Whisenhant's ho-
micidal tendencies; (4) the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
failed to supply the Parole Board with such records; (5) the
government had a statutory duty to ascertain the nature and
extent of Whisenhant's psychosis and to determine whether he
should be hospitalized for the entirety of his sentence; and (6)
the BOP was negligent in providing psychiatric treatment to
Whisenhant' 2 The district court dismissed the entire com-
plaint on discretionary function grounds. s After a panel of
the Fifth Circuit reversed, an en banc rehearing was granted.
The en banc Fifth Circuit held that three of the six claims were
barred by the exception. Under the influence standard, in con-
trast, five of the six claims would be barred.
The en banc court held that the Parole Board's decision to
release Whisenhant, as well as its decision whether to require
post-release treatment or supervision, involved the exercise of
protected discretion, and the claims regarding those decisions
were therefore barred.' The court concluded that the excep-
tion also barred the claim that the Parole Board failed to ade-
quately consider Whisenhant's records; the court reasoned that
"the manner and degree of consideration with which the Board
examines these materials is inextricably tied to its ultimate [pa-
role] decision."'
The remaining claims were not barred by the exception, in
the court's view. The BOP was required by statute to furnish
Whisenhant's records to the Parole Board; the alleged breach of
that requirement therefore was not discretionary.' Similarly,
the government was required by statute to examine and make a
report to the Attorney General on any prisoner alleged to be
insane, so that the Attorney General could decide whether to
6 See id.
' See Payton v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D. Ala. 1979), rev'd, 636 F.2d
132 (1981), rev'd on reh'g en bane, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982) (dismissing case for failure
to state a cause of action due to discretionary function exception).
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hospitalize the prisoner; the alleged failure to carry out that
examination and reporting requirement thus did not involve
discretion.'s Finally, although the BOP may have had discre-
tion in deciding whether to give Whisenhant psychiatric treat-
ment in the first place, the provision of the treatment did not
involve protected discretion.'
Judge Tjoflat, joined by three other judges, dissented from
the majority's opinion to the extent that it allowed two of the
claims to stand.' Specifically, he believed that the court
should have upheld the dismissal of the claim based on the
BOP's failure to provide required records to the Parole Board,
and the claim based on the government's failure to evaluate and
report on Whisenhant's sanity. He determined that allowing
those claims to proceed ignored that Congress did not "intend[]
to permit plaintiffs to route their claims through a palpably dis-
cretionary act to an antecedent act, and thereby to maintain an
action which the exception would otherwise bar.""'0 In his
view, permitting plaintiffs to do so, as a general matter, "frustrat-
ed" the "[t]hree predominant justifications" for the exception
and, on the facts before it, also threatened to skew parole deci-
sions27'
The first justification for the discretionary function exception
identified by Judge Tjoflat was to promote the separation of
powers by "sparing" public officials from the "vexation and time
expenditure of lawsuits" that could result in a "loss of indepen-
dence in their decision-making."" He determined that pur-
pose was thwarted by allowing a "claim based on the acts of
"' See id. at 482-83.
See id. at 483.
See id. at 483-93 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting, joined by Roney, Hill, and Frank M. Johnson,
Jr., J1.). Four other judges wrote separately to state that they would have allowed all of the
claims to go forward. See id. at 493-94 (Fay, J., joined by Henderson and Thomas A. Clark,
J3.); id. at 494 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, Judge Kravitch
joined the majority opinion except for its holding that the discretionary function exception
barred the claim that the Parole Board failed to adequately consider Whisenhant's records;
she believed that the claim "[did] state a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss." Id. at 493-94.
370 See id. at 486 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis add-
ed).
"' See id. at 486-87 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
372 See id. at 486 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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individuals who feed information to the ultimate decisionmaker,
or who perform other acts antecedent to the exercise of discre-
tion."37" He observed that, to prevail in the case before the
court, "the plaintiffs must prove that the alleged antecedent acts
caused Whisenhant's premature parole." 74 To do so, they
would have to "explore . . . the decision-making process of the
Parole Board" and, in particular, "analyze the probable effect of
certain information on the parole decision." 75
The second justification for the discretionary function excep-
tion cited by Judge Tjoflat was that courts are not equipped to
make policy determinations of the sort that underlie the exer-
cise of a discretionary function. 76 He believed that courts simi-
larly are ill-equipped to gauge the effect of an antecedent negli-
gent act upon the exercise of a discretionary function.
3 77
The third justification for the discretionary function exception
offered by Judge Tjoflat was "to prevent the enormous and un-
predictable financial cost which could result from judicial re-
examination of governmental decisions."378 He observed that
"all parole decisions overlay ministerial acts which can be per-
formed negligently so as to affect the ultimate exercise of discre-
tion." '7
In addition to citing these generally applicable justifications
for the discretionary function exception, Judge Tjoflat empha-
sized the impact of liability on the substance of parole decisions.
In particular, he suggested that Parole Board officials would be
motivated to either deny prisoners parole or delay it as long as
possible to avoid FTCA claims alleging that the release of a
prisoner was premature or otherwise improper.'
Judge Tjoflat did not rely on the statutory term "based upon,"
and his dissent in Payton was not cited in the Fisher Brothers opin-








' See id. at 492-93 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that imposition of liability would result in delay of parole).
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Brothers majority. Judge Tjoflat's concern about "enormous and
unpredictable liability" corresponds to the Fisher Brothers
majority's concern about the social cost of "virtually unlimited"
governmental liability."s Judge Tjoflat's concern about "the
vexation and time expenditure" to which federal officials would
be exposed corresponds to the Fisher Brothers majority's concern
about the social costs attending "the demands of the litigation
process on the most valuable human resources of the regulatory
agency." 2 Finally, Judge Tjoflat's concern that parole deci-
sions could be skewed corresponds to the Fisher Brothers
majority's concern about "the impact upon policymakers that
would result from the fear of virtually unlimited liability and the
prospect of virtually interminable litigation. "s"s As discussed
above, those concerns, to varying degrees, reflect a reasonable
understanding of the discretionary function exception.'
The one justification that was cited in Judge Tjoflat's dissent
but not in the Fisher Brothers opinion is not persuasive, as a gen-
eral matter. Judge Tjoflat's dissent asserted that courts would
have difficulty determining whether, and to what extent, improp-
er data gathering and other antecedent wrongful conduct affect-
ed parole decisions.' This is undoubtedly correct. That diffi-
culty, however, is likely to arise primarily when the discretion is
exercised by a group, such as the Parole Board, instead of a
single official. In any event, courts face similar difficulty in other
areas of the law requiring them to divine the intent of a govern-
mental body.' Thus, the difficulty does not relate to any insti-
"z See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (explaining that government liability for policy choices has prohibitive social cost),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995); see aLso supra notes 192-220 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing this portion of Fsher Bms.).
m See Fsher Bros. at 286-87.
See id. at 287. In addition to the specific points of concurrence discussed in the text,
compare id. at 285 (rejecting plaintiffs' "attempt to avoid application of the discretionary
function exception by looking behind the injury-causing decision and finding fault with an
aspect of the data on which it may have been based") with Payo, 679 F.2d at 486 (Tjoflat,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Congress did not "intend[] to
permit plaintiffs to route their claims through a palpably discretionary act to an antecedent
act, and thereby to maintain an action which the exception would otherwise bar").
' See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Tjoflat's concerns).
3 See Payton, 679 F.2d at 487 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to decisionmaking of Parole Board in arguing that courts "are not equipped to
investigate and weigh the factors which enter into the decisions of the other branches").
' Cf, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (referring to difficulty of
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tutional lack of competence or separation-of-powers concerns
unique to application of the exception.
With the exception just noted, Judge Tjoflat's analysis is con-
sistent with the analysis proposed in this Article. The only other
possible inconsistency arises from his suggestion, at one point,
that the exception bars claims ostensibly based upon any act
"antecedent to a discretionary function. "s 87 That suggestion
conflicts with an application of the influence standard, which
would, for example, permit a claim based on damages flowing
directly from an illegal search that preceded a decision to prose-
cute the plaintiff. Judge Tjoflat ultimately made clear that he,
too, would permit such claims to proceed.' He emphasized
that the problem with two of the claims that the majority al-
lowed to stand was that, "[t]o prevail, the plaintiffs must prove
that the alleged antecedent acts caused Whisenhant's premature
parole."' Thus, Judge Tjoflat would not apply the exception
if the plaintiff did not have to prove that the antecedent act on
which the claim was based influenced the exercise of a discre-
tionary function. Indeed, it is for that reason that Judge Tjoflat
would not have dismissed the claim that the Bureau of Prisons
was negligent in administering Whisenhant's psychiatric care.'
Judge Tjoflat agreed that the claim was not barred by the excep-
tion, based on his understanding that "the negligent psychiatric
treatment of Whisenhant proximately caused the plaintiffs' inju-
ries without the mediation of the parole decision.""9 ' Thus, the
results for which Judge Tjoflat argued in Payton are the same
that would obtain under the influence standard.
The majority opinion in Payton does not directly address the
extent to which the discretionary function exception bars claims
ostensibly based on unprotected, antecedent conduct. It does
hold, with little discussion, that the exception bars a claim based
on conduct - naxely, the Parole Board's alleged failure to
adequately consider Whisenhant's records - that is "inextricably
determining legislative motive).
s7 See Payto, 679 F.2d at 483-85, 487 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
See id. at 486 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id.
See id, at 484 n.1. (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. (emphasis added).
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tied to" the exercise of a discretionary function - namely, the
parole decision. 2" The court did not find any other anteced-
ent conduct to be inextricably tied to the discretionary conduct.
Thus, it is clear that the majority's "inextricability" standard does
not bar all of the claims that would be barred under the influ-
ence standard. Indeed, the majority's standard may be better
understood as reflecting an interpretation of the statutory term
"function" than as reflecting an interpretation of the statutory
term "based upon." "'
C. The Impact of the Influence Standard on Current Law
The application of the influence standard resolves two circuit
conflicts and dispels a third, apparent circuit conflict. Applying
the influence standard confirms that the D.C. Circuit's decision
in Jayvee Brand conflicts with the Second Circuit's decision in
Myers & Myers over whether an FTCA claim will lie for proce-
dural violations accompanying the exercise of a discretionary
function. Under the influence standard, the D.C. Circuit correct-
ly held that such claims do not lie. In addition, applying the
influence standard identifies the conflicting approaches of the
en banc Third Circuit in Fisher Brothers and the Fifth Circuit in
Payton, with respect to FTCA claims ostensibly based upon un-
protected conduct preceding the exercise of a discretionary
function. Lastly, application of the influence standard demon-
strates that there is no such conflict between Fisher Brothers and
Glacier Bay, despite the surface similarity of the fact patterns of
those cases.
In only one case discussed above (Auteiy) would application of
the influence standard allow a claim to proceed that was held to
be barred. In all other cases, application of the influence stan-
dard supported the dismissal of claims, including claims that
were allowed to proceed by the courts of appeals. In light of
that pattern, it is probable that judicial acceptance of the influ-
ence standard would, on balance, expand the discretionary func-
tion exception.
See id. at 482.
See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the term
"function" in the discretionary function exception).
[Vol. 30:691
1997] Causation and the Discretionay Function Exception 783
That result does not reflect the author's view regarding the
social desirability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, in gen-
eral, or of the discretionary function exception, in particular.'
Instead, this Article's proposal of the influence standard reflects
a judgment about the meaning of the statutory text of the dis-
cretionary function exception - specifically, the phrase "based
upon." The objective of this Article is to propose a way of better
effectuating the legislative intent underlying the exception.
"[P]erhaps ... when what has been accomplished by existing
legislation has been made clear, determination of what addition-
al legislation is necessary will also be more apparent. " '
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes an approach for analyzing a recurring,
largely unrecognized issue concerning the scope of the discre-
tionary function exception to the FrCA. The issue arises when:
(1) an FTCA plaintiff's injuries stem from a course of govern-
mental conduct; (2) the plaintiff contends that the injuries were
proximately caused by government conduct that does not consti-
tute the exercise of a discretionary function; but (3) the govern-
ment contends that the injuries were caused, instead, by other
government conduct that does constitute the exercise of a discre-
' It should be noted, however, that even some critics of sovereign immunity have
recognized the need to protect executive branch discretionary decisionmaking from the
skewing effects of tort litigation. Se 5 DAVIS, supra note 104, § 27:11, at 60-65 (arguing that
"theoretical foundation" for principle underlying discretionary function exception is
.strong"); 5 id. § 27:13, at 73-74; 5 id. § 27:45(4), at 247-48; Schuck, supra note 52, at 114-
15 (identifying purposes of discretionary function exception as to "encourage vigorous
decisionmaking by agencies and to limit judicial second-guessing of policy judgments
entrusted to those with programmatic and administrative responsibility for the outcomes";
describing these as "valid, indeed essential," purposes); id. at 116 (explaining that author's
proposal for revising governmental liability rules would be "[c]oupled with the existing
exception for discretionary functions"); see also Kratzke, supra note 209, at 1111-29 (arguing
that several exceptions to FICA should be repealed, but that discretionary function
exception "provides a good focal point" for determining appropriate scope of government
tort liability); cf, e.g., McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 742-43 (S.C. 1985) (abrogating state
sovereign immunity from tort suits in state court, with exception for, inter alia, claims
based on discretionary activities); ACUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1186 (stating that
"[d]evices other than liability.., seem appropriate guarantors of socially desirable
conduct" for activities of some officials who, apart from liability, "have relatively good, if
imperfect incentives to act in a socially desirable fashion").
"' Peck, supra note 4, at 242.
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tionary function. The conflicting contentions in such a case
require a court to determine which government conduct the
claim is based upon within the meaning of the statute that pre-
scribes the discretionary function exception.
Most federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have as-
sumed in the situation just posited that the plaintiffs claim is
based upon whatever government conduct is alleged to have
been wrongful and to have proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries. As the Fisher Brothers case illustrates, however, that as-
sumption can lead to results that the discretionary function
exception was intended to prevent. Congress intended the ex-
ception to prevent courts in FTCA actions from scrutinizing the
way executive branch officials exercise discretionary functions.
Such scrutiny is required even in some cases in which the plain-
tiff purports to base a claim on governmental conduct that does
not itself constitute the exercise of a discretionary function.
This Article proposes an "influence" standard for identifying
those cases. Thus, the standard applies when a plaintiff contends
that his injuries were proximately caused by conduct that does
not itself constitute the exercise of a discretionary function (un-
protected conduct). The standard asks whether, to prove that
contention, the plaintiff must show that the unprotected con-
duct influenced the manner in which a discretionary function
was exercised. If so, the plaintiffs claim is based upon the exer-
cise of a discretionary function and hence barred by the discre-
tionary function exception.
The influence standard would be applicable in many cases
that have been decided by the lower federal courts. Those cases
have been decided without reference to the statutory phrase
"based upon" and without consistent results. The influence test
provides an approach grounded in the statutory text that pro-
duces consistent results. More important, those results better
accord with the purpose of the discretionary function exception
than have the actual results in many cases.
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